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A bstract
During the 1980’s, many European countries introduced flexibility 
measures in their labour market to fight high and persistent levels 
of unemployment. In particular, in many countries reforms consisted 
of the introduction of more flexible labour contracts (fixed-term con­
tracts) in comparison to the predominant ones (permanent Contracts). 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effects of such contracts 
on the overall performance of the labour market.
First, an economy with firing costs is analysed theoretically. Firing 
costs are generally considered one of the most important elements in 
making a labour market rigid. This chapter stresses the fact that it 
is not just the level of severance payments what matters, but a wider 
view of employment protection. In particular, dismissal conflicts are 
modeled explicitly and their cost is derived.
In the second chapter, the effects on employment of introducing 
fixed-term contracts in an economy with only permanent contracts are 
analysed theoretically. Our findings are that higher employment at the 
expense of segmentation of the labour market only arises if wages are 
very flexible. Otherwise, employment is not necessarily higher than in 
a system with only permanent contracts. Moreover, from the social 
point of view, market segmentation is too large.
The last two chapters are empirical work applied to Spain. The 
Spanish experience appears to be particularly useful in this context 
to draw some lessons of these policies because the unemployment rate 
is the highest among OECD economies despite the several “policy 
experiments” implemented in the last two decades.
In Chapter 3 the duration pattern of fixed-term contracts and the 
determinants of the transformation of these into permanent ones are 
analysed. Evidence is found that fixed-term contracts are used as a 
screening device instrument. Also, employers use fixed-term contracts 
until their legal limit.
In Chapter 4, we study the effects of fixed-term contracts on the 
duration distribution of unemployment. It is found that the chances 
of leaving unemployment for a reference group have increased at short 
durations, while they have decreased at long durations of unemploy­
ment.
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0.1 Introduction
Most European countries are considered economies with highly regulated 
labour markets, particularly when compared to the US. At the same time, 
the fact that Europe has had very high and persistent unemployment levels 
since the mid-1970’s has reinforced this belief among both employers and 
policy makers (see OECD (1995), for instance). As a consequence, during 
the 1980’s, many European countries introduced flexibility measures in their 
labour markets trying to overcome these problems. Typically, European 
labour markets have been characterised by a wide use of permanent contracts 
with, what appear to be, high firing costs. Therefore, a common way in 
which many countries have increased flexibility has been to allow employers 
the option of hiring workers using more flexible labour contracts (fixed-term 
contracts1) leaving permanent contracts unaffected. Fixed-term contracts 
have much lower requirements in terms of firing indemnities, wages and social 
security charges than permanent contracts (see Grubb and Wells (1993)). 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effects of such contracts on the 
overall performance of the labour market.
The thesis contains some general theoretical considerations (Chapters 1 
and 2) and some empirical work applied to Spain (Chapters 3 and 4). In this 
context, Spain appears to be a striking case: Spain is considered an economy 
with one of the most regulated labour markets among OECD countries (see 
OECD (1994b)). At the same time, there have been several labour market 
reforms in this country, which were among the most radical ones. Despite 
these reforms, the unemployment rate is still the highest of the OECD coun­
tries, around 20% of the labour force. And it also has the highest proportion 
of fixed-term employees among Europe (around 33%) as a result of the imple­
mented policies2. The Spanish experience appears to be particularly useful 
to draw some lessons about the effects of these types of policies.
The first chapter proposes a framework of a firing costs economy. Firing 
costs are generally considered one of the most important elements in making 
a labour market rigid. The goal of the first chapter is to understand why 
firing costs can negatively affect employment. The market outcome of the 
model that is presented will be used as the “pre-reform” situation when the
1The terms fixed-term contracts and temporary contracts will be used equivalently.
2See Blanchard, Jimeno et al. (1995) and Toharia (1997).
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introduction of fixed-term contracts is analysed in the second chapter.
The model of firing costs of the first chapter departs from most of the 
existing literature in two ways. Most existing work on firing costs focuses 
on labour demand models where wages are assumed exogenous3. In our 
model, firing costs are introduced in an efficiency wage model and therefore 
we capture their effects on employment though wages. Second, it is stressed 
that it is not just the level of severance payments what matters, but a wider 
view of employment protection legislation. In particular, dismissal conflicts 
are modeled explicitly and their cost is derived. These two elements are put 
together and linked. In this way, our model integrates very different views put 
forward by different economists depending on the model used: the view that 
firing costs reduce employment as in the insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck 
and Snower (1988)), the idea that firing costs are neutral on employment 
put forward by Lazear (1990) and, also the possibility that firing costs are 
chosen voluntarily by firms (Booth and Chatterji (1989), Booth (1997), or 
Saint-Paul (1996a)).
In particular, firing costs are modelled in a shirking efficiency wage model 
which allows us to distinguish cases in which workers are fired without right 
of firing indemnities (when they are caught shirking, that is a disciplinary 
dismissal) from other ones in which the firm has to compensate fired workers 
(in case of redundancies or shocks4). Employers and employees have conflict­
ing interests in these two types of dismissals5. In general, whenever firms 
face a redundancy, they want to use disciplinary dismissals in order to avoid 
paying firing costs. We model firing costs in a context where worker effort 
is not perfectly observable which implies that firms can get away with such 
strategy. At the same time, workers will then tend to deny any discipli­
nary case to get a compensation, again, because of the difficulty in observing 
worker effort. As it will be discussed, a double moral hazard problem could 
arise. Our claim in this chapter is that the resolution of this problem by 
a third party will be imperfect given the information problem. This will in 
turn imply that disciplinary dismissals will not be costless (because the court
3See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), 
Bertola (1992) and Nickell (1978).
4 The terms redundancies and shocks are used interchangeably in this chapter.
5 The existing literature has typically only considered one type of dismissals 
(redundancies).
11
can erroneously declared them “unfair”6). Therefore, firing costs will reduce 
the cost of shirking and will have a negative effect on aggregate employment. 
Some policy implications are discussed. In particular, it is found that the 
solution to the problem does not necessarily imply the elimination of firing 
costs.
In Chapter 2, the effects on employment of introducing fixed-term con­
tracts in an economy with only permanent contracts are analysed. This 
“pre-reform” economy works like the one described in Chapter 1, where fir­
ing costs reduce employment. The objective of this chapter is to understand 
the apparent lack of success of fixed-term contracts, especially in bringing 
down the level of unemployment, despite the wide use of these contracts by 
most employers. We have used an efficiency wage model to investigate this 
issue theoretically. This family of models are best suited for introducing two 
types of contracts, and to analyze them in a tractable manner. At the same 
time, these models highlight an important difference between both contracts, 
that is, their duration. The main contribution of carrying out this analysis 
is that wages are endogenous, overcoming the shortcut of the first works on 
these issues where wages were fixed7. It is often stated that the reason for 
introducing fixed-term contracts is that this is “the price to pay to get full 
employment”. Our findings are that higher employment at the expense of 
segmentation of the labour market only arises if wages are completely flexible. 
If this is not the case, when fixed-term contracts are introduced, employment 
is not necessarily higher than it is in a system with only permanent contracts. 
Firms do not take into account that the increase in outflows from unemploy­
ment results in higher wages for permanent contracts. The pitfall is that a 
two-tier system is generated in the labour market. Moreover, from the social 
point of view, we find that the market segmentation is too large and that a 
higher share of permanent contracts could lead to higher employment levels. 
This means that the segmentation of the labour market not only has obvious 
welfare costs, but also does not always allow the economy to be efficient.
Chapters 3 and 4 are empirical work applied to Spain. As mentioned, 
important lessons can be derived from the Spanish experience since the flex­
ibility measures introduced were very extreme. In 1984, there was the first
6An “unfair” case is a case where the court considers that the firm is wrong and the 
worker is right and therefore he must be compensated with an indemnity.
7See Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992).
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reform which consisted of the implementation of the experiment of flexibil­
ity at the margin, that is, it allowed a new type of very flexible contract 
while leaving existing (permanent) contracts unaffected8. Permanent con­
tracts implicitly assume an indefinite duration and they are provided with 
important indemnities in case the worker is dismissed. Fixed-term contracts 
in Spain are essentially characterized as follows9: they can cover relatively 
short periods of time; they have negligible firing indemnities; the wage to 
be paid can sometimes be below the national minimum wage; social charges 
are financed by the state; and, most important, the job for which the con­
tract is signed does not necessarily need to be of temporary nature (like for 
particular projects, e.g. building, or seasonal jobs, e.g. tourism). Therefore, 
fixed-term contracts can be signed for the regular and permanent activity 
of the firm. This is in sharp contrast with the situation before the reform, 
where fixed-term contracts were only allowed for temporary jobs. In addi­
tion, fixed-term contracts cannot be used forever, after 3 years they have to 
become permanent contracts or be destroyed.
Chapter 2 highlights the importance of the renewal rate of fixed-term 
contracts into permanent ones from a theoretical point of view. In Chapter 
3 the duration pattern of fixed-term contracts and the determinants of the 
transformation of these into permanent ones are analysed using Spanish data. 
This issue is particularly important in Spain because, since the introduction 
of fixed-term contracts, around 98% of new contracts are fixed-term ones 
with only around 15% of them being transformed into permanent ones at 
their expiration date. At the same time, the widespread use of fixed-term 
contracts in Spain is mainly attributed to non-seasonal jobs. The main focus 
of the chapter is to investigate other reasons why firms opt for temporary 
hirings than for covering jobs whose underlying nature is seasonal (as it was 
the case in Spain before the 1984 reform).
We estimate a duration model for temporary employment with flexible 
duration dependence for exit into permanent employment using the longitu­
dinal Spanish Labour Force Survey for the period from 1987 to 1996. We 
find that the shape of the baseline hazard is suggestive of two possible uses of 
fixed-term contracts by employers. The fact that there are important spikes
8Saint-Paul (1993 and 1996b) argues that this type of reform can be understood as the 
outcome of political influence by incumbent employees (permanent workers).
9A more detailed description of the legal framework in Spain is done in the next 
subsection.
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at durations around 1 year is supporting the idea that fixed-term contracts 
are used by employers as a screening device instrument. “Successful work­
ers” have their fixed-term contract transformed into a permanent one much 
before the legal limit of their contract (3 years). We also find that this use 
of fixed-term contracts seems to apply more to women than to men and to 
the more skilled workers than to less skilled ones.
At the same time, a much pronounced spike at 3 years is found. That 
is, employers also use fixed-term contracts until their legal limit. This is 
suggestive that employers opt for fixed-term contracts just because these are 
a cheaper option.
We also find that the probability of obtaining a contract conversion is 
quite disconnected to the state of the Spanish business cycle. Time, fixed- 
effect imply in turn a roughly monotonically decreasing trend in the propor­
tion of fixed-term contracts being renewed on a permanent basis over the 
whole sample period.
In Chapter 4, we study the effects of fixed-term contracts on the dura­
tion distribution of unemployment with particular emphasis to the changes 
in duration dependence. Along with the high rates of unemployment, an­
other worrying feature of European labour markets is the high proportion of 
unemployment workers who have been unemployed for a long period of time. 
Spain has one of the highest shares of long-term unemployment among OECD 
economies, around 50%. Since the introduction of fixed-term contracts in 
the mid 1980’s, the Spanish labour market has become more dynamic, i.e. 
there has been an increase in inflows and outflows from unemployment to 
employment. This chapter analyses how this is captured in the duration of 
unemployment.
The chapter focuses on how the presence of fixed-term contracts changes 
the chances of leaving unemployment at different durations of unemployment. 
In particular, if the greater employment chances given by fixed-term contracts 
are not equally distributed among all the unemployed workers, and there is 
strong duration dependence10, then the duration of those who remain stuck 
in unemployment will be higher than before.
We estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectional data drawn 
from the Spanish Labour Force Survey from a very long period of time, from 
1980 to 1996 which allows us to analyse the chances of leaving unemployment
10See Alba (1996a), Bover et al.(1997) and Machin and Manning (1998).
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before and after the introduction of fixed-term contracts. We find evidence 
that the probability of leaving unemployment for a reference category at 
different durations has changed substantially over time. For very short dura­
tions, until six months, the probability has become larger and larger in years 
where the incidence of temporary contracts in the economy has become more 
and more important. For longer durations, more than 6 months, the reverse 
is true. The probability of finding a job has become lower and lower in the 
years where the presence of temporary contracts in the economy has become 
more and more important.
We also find that the chances of finding a job are significantly higher 
for those unemployed workers who became unemployed due to the end of a 
temporary contract in the previous job than for those unemployed workers 
who became unemployed for other reasons. And there is a stronger duration 
dependence for this latter group. These results are again suggestive that 
temporary contracts have implied an important increase in outflows from 
unemployment but that only some of the unemployed have enjoyed these 
greater chances at the expense of the others.
0.1.1 Labour legislation in Spain
The empirical part of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) is applied to Spain. 
As mentioned, Spain appears to be a striking case in this context and so it 
appears particularly useful in order to draw some lessons about the effects 
of the several “policy experiments” implemented in the last 15 years. Below, 
a more detailed description of Spanish labour market legislation and the 
different reforms regarding the introduction of fixed-term contracts is given11.
Current legislation regarding labour contracts is contained in the Work­
er’s Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores, ET) of 1980 which has since been 
modified on three occasions in the 1984, the 1994 and 1997 reforms. The ET 
of 1980 established priority to contracts of indefinite duration (permanent 
contracts) and allowed fixed-term contracts only for jobs which were tempo­
rary in their nature (like for particular projects, e.g. building, or seasonal 
jobs, e.g. tourism). Other situations in which fixed-term contracts were al­
lowed was for eventual increases of demand or replacement of a permanent
11 For a comparison of fixed-term contracts regulation across European countries see 
Grubb and Wells (1993), OECD (1993 and 1994a).
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worker in case of absence or temporary suspension of contract. It also es­
tablished the possibility for the Government to use fixed-term contracts as 
an incentive to promote employment. In other words, except for this last 
situation, in general it was required that there was a specific cause in order 
to sign a fixed-term contracts (“causal” fixed-term contracts).
The 1984 reform exploits this last possibility in an extreme way12. It 
introduces flexibility by extending the applicability of fixed-term contracts. 
After the reform, any worker can be hired on a temporary basis without the 
requirement of a specific cause. This implies that for any job, employers can 
either choose a permanent or a fixed-term contract.
There axe two main types of “non-causal” fixed-term contracts: a gen­
eral one (contratos temporales de fomento del empleo) and a specific one for 
youths. In this last category we can differentiate among training employment 
contracts (contratos enpracticas) and apprenticeship contract (contratos para 
la formation).
These contracts can be characterised according to: i) required conditions 
for workers and firms in order to sign the contract, ii) limits on duration and 
in) indemnities at termination.
(i) Required conditions for workers and firms in order to sign the contract
For the general fixed-term contract, workers that can sign it must have 
not exhausted in total the maximum limit of fixed-term contract duration (3 
years) with one or several employers. If a worker has already been employed 
on a fixed-term contract for this limit period, he needs to wait 12 months 
in order to be eligible for a new one. Similarly, for firms this limit binds for 
a given vacancy, that is, firms cannot fill the same vacancy for more than 3 
years with one (or several) temporary worker(s). Also, firms cannot hire a 
temporary worker if they have reduced its workforce for objective reasons or 
dismissals declared “unfair” (see below in section in) in the last 12 months13.
The above principle also applies to fixed-term contracts for youths. In 
training employment contracts, workers are also required to have a qualifi­
cation of secondary school level or more obtained within the last 4 years.
12Previous uses of fixed-term contracts to promote employment in 1981 and 1982 were 
restricted to certain types of workers (youth, long term unemployed) and firms could only 
hire a certain number of workers on fixed-term contracts according to their size.
13In practice, it is difficult to assess whether these rules have been effectively enforced.
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Apprenticeship contracts are designed for people between 16 and 20 years 
old that do not have the qualification required in the former contract.
(ii) Limits on duration
General fixed-term contracts can be signed for a minimum of 6 months, 
and fixed-term contracts for youths for a minimum of 3 months14. All of 
them have a maximum duration of 3 years. The contract cannot be renewed 
at the end of the maximum length period by another fixed-term contract for 
the same job, and it is not possible to transfer the worker to a different job 
within the firm without signing a permanent contract. Upon expiry, the firm 
can therefore choose to retain the worker by offering him a regular contract 
of undetermined duration. Otherwise, the job-worker pair needs to be split 
and the position is destroyed.
(Hi) Indemnities at termination
In this paragraph it is useful to introduce first the regulation of dismissals 
of permanent contracts, in order to assess the change that fixed-term con­
tracts imply in this domain.
It is possible to distinguish three different types of (individual) dismissal 
within the ET regulation. First, there are disciplinary dismissals, in which 
the worker is fired without right to indemnities. Second, there are objective 
dismissals, for legally authorised reasons like lack of adjustment of the worker 
to the job, recurrent justified absence from work or technological changes. In 
this case the worker has the right to a severance payment of 10 days’ wage 
per year of seniority, with a maximum of one year’s wage. Last, there are 
redundancies, that is legally authorised dismissals when a job is eliminated 
for economic or technological reasons. In this last type of dismissal, prior 
notice of 30 days is required and workers have the right of an indemnity of 
20 days’ wages per each year worked with a maximum of 12 months’ wages.
The worker always has the right to sue the employer if he disagrees with 
the dismissal case. Once the case is taken to court, it can be declared “fair” 
or “unfair” . In other words, depending if it is the firm or the worker who
14In 1992, this minimum was changed to 1 year for any fixed-term contract.
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wins the case15. In the first case, the worker is fired with no right to any 
indemnity. In the second case, the worker has the right to indemnities of 45 
days’ wages per year worked with a maximum of 42 months. He may also be 
recalled in the same job, but in general this does not occur.
If the dismissal for economic and technological reasons (redundancies) 
involves a high number of workers it is considered a collective dismissal 
in which case it requires approval in advance by the Government’s labour 
inspectorate16. These cases are negotiated between employers and workers’ 
representatives. Their agreement is important for administrative approval. 
When there is agreement, administrative approval is automatic and indem­
nities on dismissal are similar to the individual ones for “fair” cases. When 
there is no agreement, it is more difficult to have approval and if approved it 
generally implies indemnities like the ones for individual “unfair” cases.
The 1984 reform leaves unaffected the legal position of permanent work­
ers, but makes it substantially easier to hire workers on a temporary basis. 
Upon expiry, employers have to pay an indemnity of 12 days’ wages per 
year worked in the case of general fixed-term contracts, while no severance 
payment is imposed upon expiry of training or apprenticeship contracts.
Ten years after this major reform, the Spanish labour market had be­
come highly segmented without any important reduction in unemployment. 
Unions and some political parties criticised the introduction of fixed-term 
contracts because they had created a precarious labour force. Consequently, 
there was another reform in 1994 which put forward specific limits on the use 
of fixed-term contracts. The application of general fixed-term contracts was 
restricted to some categories of workers (over 45 years of age, disabled, or 
long term unemployed). The minimum and maximum limits for temporary 
contracts for the youth were changed to 6 months and 2 years, respectively. 
Also, subsidies and incentives to promote fixed-term contracts for youths 
were cut, and replaced by others that would promote the conversion of fixed- 
term contracts into permanent ones. There were also subsidies to promote
15The terms “fair” and “unfair” are defined from the worker’s perspective. That is, an 
“unfair” case is when the court considers that the firm is wrong and the worker is right and 
therefore he receives the firing cost. In the case of a “fair” dismissal, the court considers 
that the firm is right and the worker does not receive any indemnity.
16For firms that employ less than 100 workers, it has to affect at least 10 workers; for 
firms that employ between 100 and 300 employers, it has to affect at legist 10% and for 
bigger firms, at least 30 workers.
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the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts for work­
ers older than 45 years old, women in professions or jobs where they are 
underepresented and for disabled people.
Finally, the 1997 reform again tried to implement new measures to modify 
the excessive precarious employment created since 1984. As in the previous 
reform, subsidies to promote the transition from temporary to permanent 
contracts were agreed. And more importantly, a new typology of perma­
nent contract was introduced, targeted at “protected categories” of workers 
(young people younger than 30 years old, long-term unemployed, people older 
than 45 years old and disabled workers), and carrying lower firing costs than 
existing ones. The effects of this last reform are not analysed in this thesis 
because there is no data available for the most recent years.
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0.2 Overall Conclusions
Overall, the evidence from this thesis is suggestive of the following:
• When assessing the effect of firing costs on employment, it is crucial to 
stress that it is not just the level of severance payments.what matters, 
but a wider view of employment protection. In particular, in this thesis, 
dismissal conflicts have been considered and their cost has been derived.
• A crucial feature for an employment protection system to work is that 
a minority of the dismissal cases are taken to court and, if so, the 
exception are declared “unfair” by court. For this, it is important to 
set a gap wide enough between severance payments for cases declared 
“unfair” and cases declared “fair” . And, second, different indemnities 
should be set for “unfair” cases depending on whether it is considered 
that it is the worker’s or the firm’s initiative.
• Higher employment at the expense of segmentation of the labour mar­
ket only arises if wages are very flexible. Otherwise, when introducing 
fixed-term contracts, employment is not necessarily higher than in a 
system with only permanent contracts.
• Moreover, from the social point of view, market segmentation is too 
large. Higher renewal rates of fixed-term contracts into permanent 
contracts lead to higher employment levels.
• In Spain, after the introduction of fixed-term contracts, the large in­
crease in the proportion of these in total employment can be mainly 
attributed to non-seasonal jobs. We find evidence that employers use 
fixed-term contracts as an screening device instrument. We also find 
that these contracts provide a cheaper option for employers and, in this 
case, they are used until their legal limit.
• After the introduction of fixed-term contracts, there has been a big 
increase in the inflows and outflows from unemployment in Spain. We 
find evidence that the greater employment chances given by fixed-term 
contracts have increased the probability of leaving unemployment at 
short durations of unemployment while the reverse is true at long du­
rations of unemployment.
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• The overall policy conclusion of this thesis is that policies aimed at 
improving labour market flexibility and, more generally, at facing the 
European unemployment problem, should be targeted at the core rather 
than at the fringe of labour contracts.
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Chapter 1
Em ploym ent Protection and 
U nem ploym ent in an Efficiency 
Wage M odel
1.1 Introduction
Firing costs axe often blamed for unemployment in Europe (see OECD (1995), 
for instance). The aim of this chapter is to investigate this widespread belief 
from a theoretical point of view. The model we build makes two main points. 
First, firing costs are introduced in an efficiency wage model to capture their 
effects on employment through wages. Second, dismissal conflicts are mod­
eled explicitly and their cost is derived. In particular, two types of dismissals 
are considered, redundancies and disciplinary dismissals, where employers 
and employees have conflicting interests1.
Most of the existing work on firing costs focuses on labour demand mod­
els and the only type of dismissals considered are redundancies2. These 
models are very useful for understanding the effects of firing costs on the 
dynamic functioning of the labour market. However, the effects on aggregate 
employment are ambiguous and remain in partial equilibrium. The implicit
JThe firm has to compensate the worker when facing a redundancy while no compen­
sation is required in a disciplinary dismissal.
2See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), 
Bertola (1990 and 1992) and Nickell (1978).
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assumption of labour demand models is that wages axe exogenous and do not 
change in the presence of firing costs3. In our model, wages are endogenous 
and firing exogenous. In this way, the model highlights another dimension of 
firing costs which is not captured by labour demand models. To focus on the 
effects of firing costs on the wage-setting is particularly important for those 
unemployment models in which in the long-run the unemployment rate is 
determined entirely by long-run supply factors (see Layard et al (1991)).
Despite the prevalent idea of the (negative) effect of firing costs on em­
ployment, specially among policy makers and employers, there are very dif­
ferent views among economists depending on the model used. For instance, 
according to the insider-outsider theory put forward by Lindbeck and Snower 
(1988), firing costs are a source of market power for incumbent workers (the 
insiders) vis-a-vis the unemployed (the outsiders). Insiders use their market 
power to exercise upward pressure on their wages and thereby generating un­
employment. According to this view, the higher the firing costs, the higher 
the unemployment.
A completely different view of firing costs is the one by Lazear (1990). 
He shows that if markets are perfect and complete, then flexible wages can 
undo all the effects of firing costs and, therefore, firing costs are neutral 
on employment. Workers pay ex-ante a fee which is equal to the severance 
payment they get in case they are fired. If they keep the job, they get their 
fee back with higher wages. In such a world, for any level of firing costs, it 
is always possible to write an optimal contract that undoes all the effects of 
severance payments.
A third view of firing costs highlights the possibility of firing costs arising 
endogenously. This approach is motivated by the fact that sometimes firms 
and workers negotiate severance payments which do not coincide with the 
ones legally set; or even, some firms offer severance payments in the absence 
of employment protection legislation. Several authors have investigated this 
idea in different contexts. For instance, Booth and Chatterji (1989) construct 
a model of firm-specific training where the returns to training are uncertain 
as well as the outside options for workers. In such a context, the costs of 
training are shared between the firm and the worker because there exists 
the possibility that workers quit. In case of being dismissed, workers are 
compensated by this cost with a redundancy payment. Also, Booth (1997)
3An exemption of this is Bertola (1990).
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argues that in a two-period model, where it is in the interest of firms to have 
long-term employment relationships, if workers are risk-averse they prefer a 
contract with redundancy payment, and risk-neutral firms find it optimal to 
offer it. Finally, in Saint-Paul (1996a), in a dynamic efficiency wage model, 
explores how firing costs arise endogenously. Firms may chose to voluntarily 
offer firing costs in their labour contracts because these help firms to credibly 
commit to more stable employment policies in an uncertain environment.
These three views exposed above have radically different ideas of firing 
costs. One could summarise crudely that firing costs are “bad” according 
to the first view, “neutral” according to the second view or even “good” 
according to the third view since they can be an optimal instrument for 
firms. Consequently, these three frameworks summarise all possible effects 
of firing costs over employment. The model presented here is an efficiency 
wage model where dismissal conflicts are costly. As it will be seen, modelling 
firing costs in this way allows to integrate the three different views mentioned 
above.
There is a commonly held idea that firing costs are high because they 
involve large administrative and legal costs and that these lead to higher 
labour costs. Although this point is often made, it is usually modeled in a 
simplistic way: firing costs paid by firms are assumed to be higher than the 
indemnity that firms have to pay to workers4. But this is not actually the 
case in most European countries. Instead, the source of higher firing costs 
has to do more with the fact that there exist dismissal conflicts between 
employers and employees and that the law sets different severance payments 
depending on the case being declared “fair” or “unfair” by court. In other 
words, depending if it is the firm or the worker who wins the case5. For 
instance, in Spain, the cost of a case declared “fair” is 20 days’ wages per 
each year worked with a maximum of 12 months’ wages. But if the case 
is declared “unfair” , the cost is more than double, 45 days’ wages per year 
worked with a maximum of 42 months6.
4See Burda (1990) for a model of this sort.
5The terms “fair” and “unfair” are defined from the worker’s perspective. That is, an 
“unfair” case is when the court considers that the firm is wrong and the worker is right and 
therefore he receives the firing cost. In the case of a “fair” dismissal, the court considers 
that the firm is right and the worker does not receive any indemnity.
6See Grubb and Wells (1993) for a comparison of these indemnities in different Euro­
pean countries.
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In this chapter, we explicitly model dismissal conflicts and their cost. 
Conflicts between employers and employees can arise for very different rea­
sons. In general, whenever firms face a redundancy, they want to use discipli­
nary dismissals in order to avoid paying firing costs. We model firing costs in 
a context where worker effort is not perfectly observable. This actually pro­
vides a rationale for the existence of workers’ right to sue their employers in 
case of disagreement. In such a context, workers can be in a weaker position 
because firms can get away with the use of disciplinary dismissals whenever 
they need to adjust their workforce (i.e. in case of redundancy). Therefore, 
there is a reason for job protection legislation to include the right for employ­
ees to take cases to court. The drawback is that workers will then tend to 
deny any disciplinary case to get a compensation (specially if the indemnity 
is higher when the case is declared “unfair”), again, because of the difficulty 
in observing worker effort. As it will be discussed, a double moral hazard 
problem could arise. Our claim in this chapter is that the resolution of this 
problem by a third party will be imperfect given the information problem.
The existence of imperfect resolutions of dismissal cases will in turn imply 
that disciplinary dismissals will not be costless and firing costs will have a 
negative effect on aggregate employment. As it will be discussed at the end 
of the chapter, the solution does not necessarily imply the elimination of 
firing costs. Rather, what will appear to be important is the gap between 
the severance payment for cases considered “unfair” and those “fair” .
We concentrate on dismissal conflicts of small/medium firms for which 
“individual” dismissal regulation applies. In case of large firms, redundancies 
are generally under the “collective” dismissal regulation which implies that 
the number of redundancies and their total cost axe bargained with a third 
party (generally, unions)7.
In our model, firms will bear a firing cost that is exactly the same as 
the indemnity received by the worker. This is the case for most European 
countries. In countries in which the administrative approval processes are 
very complex8, many of the cases are settled by the worker and the firm out 
of court, precisely to avoid these costs. Therefore, again, firms do not bear a
7See Booth (1996 and 1997) for a model of firing costs in unionised sectors of the 
economy.
8Typically, this is case in southern European countries (see Grubb and Wells (1993) 
for several indicators of the “strictness” of employment protection legislation).
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higher cost than the indemnity received by workers. The worker receives a 
settlement which amount lies between the legal severance payment and the 
(expected) cost had the case gone to court. In this sense, the firing costs due 
to dismissal conflicts that are derived in the model can be thought as the 
upper bound of what a worker could receive from bargaining with the firm.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. First, firing costs axe 
described, and their implications for (efficiency) wages and employment are 
derived. In the last section, we discuss some policy implications.
1.2 The model
The model is a version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
with firing costs. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz, a worker’s effort is not perfectly 
observable and there is a detection technology that catches shirking workers 
(never erroneously) with some probability q (where q < 1). When a worker 
is found shirking, he is fired and becomes unemployed. Workers also have an 
exogenous probability, b, of being separated from their job for redundancy 
reasons9. In the next section we describe how firing costs are modeled.
1.2.1 Redundancies and disciplinary dismissals in con­
flict
Most industrialised countries have a job protection legislation framework that 
protects workers against redundancies. The idea is that a redundancy is an 
exogenous event to the worker and imposes a cost to him and thus he must be 
compensated for it. At the same time, employers are allowed to fire workers 
for disciplinary reasons without having to pay any compensation.
A framework where worker’s effort is imperfectly observable is best suited 
for considering another common feature of job protection legislation, namely 
the right for workers to sue employers in case of disagreement.
Whenever firms need to adjust their workforce, they want to use discipli­
nary dismissals to avoid paying firing costs. And the difficulty in observing 
worker effort means there is some chance that firms can get away with such
9The terms adverse economic shocks and redundancies are used interchangeably here.
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strategy10. The right for workers to sue employers in case of disagreement 
can compensate for this imperfection. But then, similarly to firms, workers 
will deny any reasons for disciplinary dismissal to get a compensation based 
on unjust grounds. In such a context, both true disciplinary cases and hidden 
redundancies arrive to court as disciplinary cases. Court’s decision is based 
on whatever evidence (if any) is presented by the agents, which is not per­
fectly correlated with reality given the information problem. So, in general, 
courts are not able to distinguish perfectly between true disciplinary cases 
and hidden redundancies. Thus, the resolution by a third party will tend to 
be imperfect given the information problem.
In the model, this is represented by the fact that some (true) disciplinary 
dismissal cases could be considered “unfair” and some hidden redundancies 
could be declared “fair” by court. In other words, in the first case, workers 
may be compensated when they should not. And in the second case, firms 
avoid paying firing costs when they should have paid them. We define d 
as the probability that a (true) disciplinary dismissal is declared “unfair”. 
Firms have a greater chance to prove that a real disciplinary case was such 
than to prove that a redundancy was a disciplinary case. But still, given 
the information problem, it is possible that the court declares a dismissal to 
be disciplinary when it was a redundancy (i.e. the “hidden” redundancy is 
declared “fair”). Let (1 —z) be the probability of this happening. Therefore, 
when the firm faces a redundancy and claims that is a disciplinary case, it 
will have to pay firing costs with probability z, where z > d. That is, the 
probability that the case is declared in favour of the worker (i.e., “unfair”) 
is lower when the case was originally a disciplinary case. Or, in other words, 
the firm is more likely to end up paying firing indemnities in a declared 
disciplinary case when it was originally a redundancy. We assume that the 
legislation fixes a severance payment of c for redundancies and a severance 
payment of C if the case is taken to court and is declared “unfair” (where 
c < C). Then, given the double moral hazard problem, the firm’s expected 
firing cost of a (true) disciplinary dismissal is dC and of a redundancy is zC. 
Table 1.1 below summarises firing costs described11.
10Malo (1998) considers the case where firms use disciplinary dismissals in cases of 
redundancies in a model where firing costs are bargained in the shadow of the law between 
employer and employee.
11 Let’s assume that in case of redundancies presented as disciplinary cases, the firm can 
never show evidence of the case and the cost is zC. In the case of real disciplinary cases,
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Table 1.1: Firing costs for redundancies and disciplinary cases
Reality Declaration Expected Cost
of firm of worker
Redundancy Redundancy accepts c
Redundancy Disciplinary denies zC  1
Disciplinary Disciplinary denies dC
To sum up, given the context described above, there is always an incentive 
for firms to declare redundancies as disciplinary cases and for the worker to 
deny any disciplinary case. A further discussion of this double moral hazard 
problem is done in the last section of the chapter.
1.2.2 Non-shirking condition
In this section, the non-shirking condition of workers is analysed. Workers 
are risk neutral12. Their instantaneous utility function is: U(w,e) = w — e, 
where w is the wage and e is the effort. Workers effort choices are discrete. 
If they shirk, they expend zero effort and production is zero. The effort 
required to perform in the job is e > 0.
Workers choose the level of effort that maximises their utility actualised 
at rate r. By VJ, we denote the present discounted utility of an employed 
worker when shirking (i= S ) or non shirking (i= N ). Firms want to offer 
a contract such that workers expend the optimal effort. In what follows, 
the condition under which a worker will choose not to shirk is studied (the 
non-shirking condition, NSC).
When a worker does not shirk, he gets a utility equal to:
rV g  = w - e  + b(Vv + z C - V g )  (1.1)
while if the worker decides to shirk his utility is:
rV£ = w + b(Vu + zC  — V£) +  q(Vu + d C -  V£) (1.2)
if the firm is able to proof the case with probability k , then the cost is dC  where dC =
0(1 — k) +  kzC. Thus z > d .
12For a model where workers are risk averse, see Booth (1997).
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As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), shirking saves the current disutility 
of effort but it implies a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This risk is 
proportional to the probability of being caught shirking. Firing costs also 
influence the effort decision here because of the imperfect court decisions. 
With probability d, shirking workers may be compensated with a severance 
payment. This reduces the cost of shirking.
The worker will choose to provide an effort e, if and only if Vg > Vg. We 
can write this condition using equations (1.1) and (1.2) and get the N SC  in 
form of utilities:
V i -  Vv > -  + dC =  K  (1.3)
Q
This condition states that in order to provide incentives, the punishment 
of losing a job must be at least equal to the opportunity cost of shirking, 
denoted by K. Substituting this condition in equation (1.1), we get the 
incentive compatible wage:
w > e — bzC +  rVu + K (r + b) = w (1.4)
In this wage equation, we can distinguish between the reservation wage 
(first three terms) and the rent linked to the incentive problem (last term). 
For C  =  0, this condition is the same as in the original Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984). In order to provide incentives, wages need to exceed the reservation 
wage by a rent, K. This rent is proportional to the opportunity cost of not 
shirking weighted by the term (r +  b). The higher the discount rate, the 
more a worker values the saving of effort today. The higher the probability 
of being fired for other reasons than (truly) shirking cases (i.e. shocks), the 
more costly it is to expend effort today.
For C > 0, we can distinguish two types of effects of firing costs: those 
directly related with the incentive problem and those that are not. Firing 
costs affect the incentive problem because to the extent that (truly) discipli­
nary dismissals are declared “unfair” (i.e., d > 0), legal severance payments 
reduce the punishment associated with being fired when caught shirking. 
This implies that firms have to pay higher rents in order to prevent shirk­
ing, as can be seen in the above non-shirking conditions (see equation (1.3)). 
This effect of firing costs has the same flavour as that in the insider-outsider 
theory, where firing costs increase market power of incumbent workers.
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At the same time, independently of the incentive problem, the introduc­
tion of mandated severance payments allows the employer to reduce the wage 
exactly by the same proportion that the present discounted utility of an em­
ployee is increased, without affecting incentives. This can be seen in the 
firing cost element of the reservation wage (see equation (1.4)). The idea 
is that lower wages today, together with compensation when' being fired for 
shocks, leave the present discounted utility of being employed unchanged. 
This effect of firing costs is the same as proposed by Lazear (1990)13.
Although this last mechanism is not directly related with the incentive 
problem, it has very interesting links with efficiency wages in models in which 
firing is not exogenous. As mentioned, in the standard efficiency wage model 
without severance payments, workers are paid a “firing premium” in order 
to prevent shirking because expending effort is more costly the higher the 
probability of being fired due to adverse economic shocks. When a sever­
ance payment is imposed, firms face two opposite effects in the presence of 
shocks: they have to pay an implicit firing cost to avoid shirking (the “firing 
premium”), but they can lower wages because workers are being compen­
sated when fired after a shock14. An important further insight is made by 
Saint-Paul (1996a): in a dynamic efficiency wage model, it is in the interest of 
firms to voluntarily include a severance pay in the labour contract that they 
offer. This is one possible way for the firm to credibly commit to have a more 
stable employment policy when facing shocks, which then allows the firm to 
reduce directly the “firing premium” to be paid. The optimal severance pay­
ment is such that the “firing premium” of the efficiency wage is completely 
compensated. In the present model, the imperfect court resolutions imply 
that firms do not want to offer severance payments to workers15.
Back to the Non-Shirking Condition, if a contract satisfies the N S C , that 
is, if the worker is paid at least w or, if being unemployed is a sufficiently 
large punishment (V > Vu), the worker will choose to expend the effort e.
13So, for d = 0, the two models have the same predictions (see section (1.2.4) where the 
market equilibrium is solved).
14See Katsimi (1998) for a more detailed derivation of this mechanism in a fully sto­
chastic efficiency wage model.
15If d = 0, firms would offer firing costs in the present model. In the case of d = 0, for 
C = e/q  the two models would coincide. Still, in the present model, severance payments 
axe set legally while in Saint-Paul they axe endogenous. See Booth (1997) for a discussion 
where the level of mandated firing costs may differ from those bargained.
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We define VE as the expected utility in equilibrium. The firm chooses the 
minimum wage at which the worker will not shirk, so that in equilibrium the 
N SC  is binding and VE = V g = V§.
1.2.3 Hiring decisions
All firms in the model are identical and infinitely lived. They chose employ­
ment so as to maximise the expected present value of profits discounted at 
rate r. We denote by II the present discounted value of marginal profits. We 
have:
rU = f ( L )  - w -  b(zC +  n)
where f{L t) is the production function with f '(L t) > 0 and f" (L t) < 0 .
In the presence of firing costs, the marginal cost of hiring a worker is given 
by the wage plus the future expected cost of being fired. There is no cost 
of posting vacancies, so firms hire workers to the point where the marginal 
profit is zero, i.e. II =  0. Labour demand in steady state is given by:
f ( L )  = w + bzC (1.5)
This equation shows that, for given wages, firing costs reduce labour 
demand proportionally to their expected present value.
1.2.4 Market equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each firm, taking as given all other firms’ wages and 
employment, finds it optimal to offer the going wage rather than a different 
wage. The key market variable that determines firm individual behaviour is 
the present value of the utility of an unemployed worker, Vy. Let a be the 
rate of exit from unemployment. To simplify, we suppose that unemployment 
benefits are zero.
We have:
rVu = a(VE -  Vu)
Given that the N SC  is satisfied, we have that in equilibrium:
rVv = aK  (1.6)
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Now, substituting equation (1.6) in equation (1.4), we get the efficiency 
wage curve in equilibrium:
w = e — bzC +  K (r  + b -f a) (1-7)
In equilibrium, the incentive compatible wage is higher the higher the exit 
rate from unemployment. This result is also found in Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984). The rent linked with the incentive problem is weighted by a because 
the higher a, the less becoming unemployed is a penalty.
We derive employment, L, from the steady state flows condition: in steady 
state inflows to unemployment are given by bL. Outflows are given by a(N  — 
L), where N  is the total of workers in the economy. Thus,
a{N - L )  = bL (1.8)
Therefore,
a NL — ----- -
c l T b
Combining equations (1.5) and (1.7), we get that the equilibrium outflow 
rate of unemployment, a*, is given by:
f ( L )  = e - b z C  + K{r + b + a*) +  bzC (1.9)
In equation (1.9), it can be seen that the second type of effect of severance 
payments mentioned before can be fully undone: the second and the forth 
element of this equation cancel out. The idea is that if markets are complete 
and perfect, and firing costs are fully transferred to workers, then they are 
neutral on employment because the wage is reduced by the same proportion
as the increased shadow cost of labour (see Lazear (1990)).
However, in this model, even if firing costs are fully received by workers, 
they are not neutral because they affect the rent, K . The effects of sever­
ance payments on the efficiency wage setting have no counteracting effects 
through the non-wage component of the shadow cost of labour. Therefore, 
the wage schedule is shifted to the left and it has a negative impact effect on 
employment. It is interesting to note that even if the wage is set by the firm, 
it is not possible to fully endogenize the severance payments in the workers’
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wage. As mentioned, this result is due to the presence of a double moral 
hazard problem that can only be resolved imperfectly by a third party. This 
implies that firing costs have a real effect because they reduce the cost of 
shirking.
The aggregate N SC  can also be written in terms of the unemployment 
rate, u . Replacing equation (1.8) into equation (1.7), we get:’
w = e — bzC +  K r +
bN
N - L
= e — bzC +  K  [r +  b/u]
where u =  (N  — L )/N  .
This expression can be represented in the (wt L) space. Figure 1.1 shows 
the labour market effects of neutral and non-neutral firing costs. The case 
where firing costs are neutral corresponds to the case where there is not such 
a double moral hazard problem16. A further discussion is developed in the 
next section.
16In such a case, disciplinary dismissals have zero cost and therefore they do not affect 
the rent to be paid to workers. Consequently, firing costs are neutral on employment.
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NSC
Non-neutral firing costs
No firing costs
Neutral firing costs
N=LHc=o)
Figure 1.1: Market equilibrium with neutral and non-neutral firing costs
1.2.5 Policy implications
In the model presented above, the existence of job protection legislation in a 
context in which worker effort is not perfectly observable implied that firing 
costs had a negative effect on employment. As explained, the problem in such 
a system is that there is always an incentive for conflict between employer 
and employee, i.e. for the employer to claim any dismissal to be disciplinary 
and for the worker to deny any disciplinary case. This, in turn, implies 
imperfect resolutions by third parties. The goal of this section is to discuss 
some possible policy implications derived from the model above.
The mechanism that generates such a double moral hazard problem is 
that, for firms, the expected cost of a redundancy is higher than the expected 
cost of a declaring such a case as a disciplinary dismissal. And, in turn, for 
workers, the expected benefit of denying a disciplinary dismissal becomes 
positive. Following the model presented above (see Table 1.1), when firms 
declare redundancies as disciplinary cases and workers deny all disciplinary 
cases, the court is not able to perfectly detect all the real disciplinary cases. 
The court is able to catch a hidden redundancy with probability z. And it
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is able to discover real disciplinary cases with probability (1 — d). Therefore, 
firms find it worth it to declare disciplinary cases when facing redundancies 
if:
c > zC  (1-10)
If firms misuse disciplinary cases, then workers have an incentive to deny 
any of them because:
dC >  0 (1.11)
If these two conditions are met, then the double moral hazard is an equi­
librium. That is, all dismissals are taken to court as disciplinary cases. As 
shown in the previous section, in such a case, firing costs are not neutral on
employment. As can be seen from conditions (1.10) and (1.11), policies that
concentrate on undoing the double moral hazard problem do not necessarily 
imply the complete removal of severance payments.
As mentioned, in general, most employment protection legislation systems 
set higher severance payments for the cases being declared “unfair” than for 
those considered “fair” . The idea behind this goes in the right direction in 
the sense that it tries to punish for unjust dismissals. For large enough C, 
the incentive of firms to cheat could be undone (see equation (1.10)) and 
therefore, there would be no double moral hazard17. In such a case, high 
severance payments for “unfair” dismissals have a punishment role for firms 
who would use disciplinary dismissals when facing a redundancy. However, 
such a policy may not be sufficient. If C  fails to be high enough, it motivates 
cheating from both agents which in turn generates imperfect court decisions. 
And the resulting average cost of firing is higher because some dismissals are 
paid at the “unfair” rate18. Moreover, this does not seem to be the most 
efficient policy since it does not have any punishment role for the worker 
when he denies true disciplinary cases.
A more efficient policy would be one that punishes any agent found lying. 
That is, on the one hand, to set a severance payment that firms have to pay,
17If the firm does not cheat, then the worker does not cheat either since such strategy 
would become self-revealing.
18See Polinsky and Shavell (1979 and 1991) for a discussion on the optimal tradeoff 
between the probability of catching cheating individuals and the magnitude of fines.
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Cp, when the court catches a hidden redundancy. On the other hand, to 
set a penalty for workers, Cw, whenever caught denying a true disciplinary 
dismissal. Table 1.2 summarises the expected costs of firing for the firm and 
worker under such policy proposal.
Table 1.2: Firing costs: a policy proposal
Reality Declaration Expected Cost
of firm of worker for firm for worker
Redundancy Redundancy accepts c
Redundancy Disciplinary denies zCp
Disciplinary Disciplinary denies dCw
Under such a policy, taking d and z as given, truth-telling of both agents 
is an equilibrium if the following two conditions are satisfied:
c — zCp < 0
and
—dCw < 0
Note that for any given d and z, a high enough gap between severance 
payments for cases declared “unfair” and cases declared “fair” , that is for 
a large Cp — c, and for any positive penalty to the worker, that is Cw, the 
above conditions would hold.
This policy highlights that for an employment protection system to work, 
specially when worker effort is not observable, two things are important. 
First, the difference between the level of firing costs set for cases declared 
“unfair” and “fair” has to be high enough. Second, different indemnities 
should be set for “unfair” cases depending on whether it is considered that 
it is the worker’s or the firm’s initiative.
1.3 Conclusion
Firing costs are often blamed for depressing employment levels. But there are 
very different views of firing costs among economists: some models indeed
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predict that firing costs reduce employment while in other contexts firing 
costs have no effect on employment. Also, in some other environments, firing 
costs are actually instruments chosen voluntarily by firms. In this chapter, 
we have proposed a model that stresses that it is not just the level of sev­
erance payments what matters, but a wider view of employment protection. 
In particular, dismissal conflicts and their cost have been considered. As 
discussed before, the model presented integrates the different existing views 
of firing costs.
More precisely, we have analysed the problem behind the conflict between 
employer and employee in cases of disciplinary dismissals and redundancies, 
in a context where effort is imperfectly observable. There is a double moral 
hazard problem that can only be resolved imperfectly by a third party. The 
conclusion is that firing costs would have a negative effect on employment 
because they modify the rent to be paid to workers in order to prevent those 
workers from shirking.
The main policy conclusions are two. First, to set a gap wide enough 
between severance payments for cases declared “unfair” and cases declared 
“fair” . Second, any agent caught lying should be punished. In our model, 
different severance payments should be set for hidden redundancies declared 
“unfair” and for truly disciplinary cases declared “unfair”. With such a 
policy, the different firing costs for “unfair” dismissals have a punishment role 
for both employer and employee and, therefore, its implementation should 
eliminate the double moral hazard problem.
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Chapter 2
Fixed-term  Contracts and 
Unem ploym ent: an Efficiency 
Wage analysis
4
2.1 Introduction
Most European countries are considered economies with highly regulated 
labour markets, particularly when compared to the US. At the same time, 
it is also a well known fact that, since the mid-1970s, Europe has had much 
higher unemployment levels than the US. It has often been suggested that 
the different degrees of flexibility of their labour markets could be responsible 
for the differences in their labour market performances. Even if there is an 
ongoing debate on the possible causes of European unemployment and, in 
particular, on the possible effect of labour market flexibility1, it has been per­
suasive enough for many European countries to start implementing reforms 
in their labour markets: more flexible regulations have been introduced to 
fight high and persistent levels of unemployment.
Typically, European labour markets have been characterised by a wide 
use of permanent contracts with, what appear to be, high firing costs. A 
common way to increase flexibility has been to allow employers the option
1See Bean (1994) and Layard et al. (1991) for a survey on unemployment. See Jackman 
et al. (1996), Nickell and Layard (1998) and Piore (1986) for the debate on labour market 
flexibility.
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of hiring workers using fixed-term contracts with negligible firing costs. For 
most countries, these fixed-term contracts cannot be used continuously and 
forever. They require a conversion into permanent contracts after a specific 
amount of time2. In addition, for most countries, the job for which the worker 
is hired with a fixed-term contract is not required to be a seasonal one3.
After their introduction, fixed-term contracts have be6n widely used. 
More surprisingly, they have been used for all types of jobs and occupa­
tions. However, unemployment has remained as high as before the reforms4. 
At the same time, this type of reform has created a two-tier system and the 
labour market has become highly segmented.
This chapter builds a theoretical model to reconcile these facts: un­
changed unemployment levels despite the wide use of fixed-term contracts. 
The introduction of fixed-term contracts is analysed in the framework of an 
efficiency wage model. Permanent contracts are the standard way to pro­
vide incentives with high wages, but fixed-term contracts are cheaper. The 
firm’s choice of hiring with one contract or the other is analysed. As in 
chapter 1 , firing will be given exogenously. So, in the terminology of labour 
demand models, firms would be operating in the hiring regime. Fixed-term 
incentive compatible contracts are then characterised. We will show that the 
instrument that allows the provision of incentives with fixed-term contracts 
is not their wage but the renewal rate of these contracts into permanent ones. 
Fixed-term contracts are chosen by firms when they are cheap enough. But 
this can imply an externality which can make aggregate employment, in the 
system with only permanent contracts, be higher. Firms do not take into 
account, in the two-tier system, that the increase in outflows from unem­
ployment results in higher wages for permanent contracts. In this case, the 
optimal renewal rate of fixed-term contracts from the social point of view is 
one. That is, employment can be increased by reducing the inflows back to 
unemployment.
There is a growing literature on the impact of fixed-term contracts on
2For Ireland, United Kingdom and Denmark this does not apply since their labour 
markets are more flexible. Also it does not apply to Germany, where there is a complete 
separation of permanent contracts and temporary contracts (only to be used for temporary 
jobs). See Segura et al. (1991) for a detailed study.
3Except for France and Portugal.
4 See Alogoskoufis et al. (1995).
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several aspects of the labour market5. In relation to the effects on aggregate 
employment, the literature has been dominated by partial equilibrium mod­
els of labour demand6. These models have the same characteristics as those 
of labour demand with firing costs7. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
these models are very useful to understand the effects of these firing restric­
tions on the dynamic functioning of the labour market. But the effects on 
aggregate employment are ambiguous and remain in partial equilibrium.
Bentolila and Dolado (1994) studied the effects of fixed-term contracts 
on wages in a wage bargaining model. Here, we choose an efficiency wage 
model to study the impact of fixed-term contracts on employment through 
their effect on wages8. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this kind of model is best 
suited for considering a broader view of employment protection legislation 
and not just severance payments.
One additional characteristic of fixed-term contracts is that they differ 
in duration with respect to permanent contracts. The existing literature 
has not taken this into account explicitly. In a competitive labour market, 
the duration of contracts does not matter. In an efficiency wage model, 
duration of contracts is an important source of incentives. Studying fixed- 
term contracts in an efficiency wage model allows us to explicitly address the 
question of how incentives may be provided in short duration contracts. This, 
in turn, would answer the previously mentioned striking fact that fixed-term 
contracts are even used for jobs where duration matters. So in the model, 
the share of fixed-term contracts will be endogenous.
This chapter highlights the links between different rigidities in the labour 
market. Employment and the share of temporary contracts axe affected in 
the same way by the firing costs associated with permanent contracts and 
the flexibility of wages in fixed-term contracts. The mechanism by which 
the creation of employment and, more precisely, permanent employment is
5See, for example, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999), Alba (1994, 1996 and 
1998), Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Jimeno and Tohaxia 
(1993 and 1996) and Saint-Paul (1996a).
6 Exceptions of this are Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) and Alonso-Borrego et al. 
(1999).
7See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), 
Bertola (1990 and 1992) and Nickell (1978).
8In Saint-Paul (1996a), chapter 7, this is also studied although it is assumed that 
temporary workers axe paid at the competitive wage.
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discouraged is the combination of these last two. The introduction of fixed- 
term contracts does not remove completely the effect of firing costs unless 
the wages of fixed-term contracts are perfectly flexible. For this reason, 
two extreme situations could generate higher employment than a two-tier 
system with unchanged firing costs and less than perfectly flexible fixed-term 
contracts’ wages. One would be a situation where the wages of fixed-term 
contracts are very high. In this system, permanent contracts alone would 
generate higher employment than the two-tier system. The other situation 
would be the case with perfectly flexible fixed-term contracts’ wages. In this 
case, full employment would arise.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2 the model is intro­
duced. First, we solve it for an economy where only permanent contracts are 
available. Then, we solve it for the case in which fixed-term contracts are also 
available. That is, the optimal incentive compatible contract is described, 
and then the market outcome is analysed and compared to the situation 
where only permanent contracts are available.
2.2 The m odel
The model is a version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
with two types of contracts. Firms can choose to hire new workers with a 
permanent contract (PC) or with a fixed-term or temporary contract9 (TC). 
Contracts differ in length and firing costs. To make the model as simple 
as possible, we assume that fixed-term contracts last one period and that 
permanent contracts can last an infinite number of periods. A worker can 
only be hired once on a fixed-term contract by the same firm. Thus, after 
the one period fixed-term contract, the firm has to decide whether to renew 
the worker into a permanent contract or to fire him10. Temporary contracts 
are going to be renewed into permanent contracts with a probability R.
The model is set in discrete time and workers decide in each period 
whether or not to shirk. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz, a worker’s effort is not
9The terms fixed-term and temporary contract are used interchangeably here.
10This is only a simplifying assumption. Assuming that fixed-term contracts can be 
renewed into further fixed-term contracts does not change the results because, as it will be 
shown, it is crucial that at some point fixed-term contracts are renewed into permanent 
ones.
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perfectly observable and there is a detection technology that catches shirking 
workers (never erroneously) with some probability q (where q < 1). When a 
worker is found shirking, he is fired and becomes unemployed. To simplify, 
we suppose that unemployment benefits are zero.
As in Chapter 1, we assume that the legislation fixes a severance pay­
ment for permanent contracts, but no severance payment for fixed-term 
contracts11. Modelling mandated severance payments in a shirking efficiency 
wage model allows us to distinguish cases in which workers are fired without 
right of firing indemnities (when they are caught shirking, that is a discipli­
nary dismissal) from other ones in which the firm has to compensate fired 
workers (in case of redundancies or shocks12). Since we focus on hiring deci­
sions of firms, the modelling of the second case is kept simple: workers have 
an exogenous probability b of being separated from their job, in that case 
they are protected by the legislation.
Another difference between permanent and fixed-term contracts is that 
while a worker in a PC has the right to sue employers in every case of dis­
missal, workers with a TC cannot do it when they are not renewed13. As 
in Chapter 1, in a context where effort is imperfectly observable, the court 
resolutions cannot be perfect because firms misuse disciplinary cases and 
workers deny any disciplinary case. This is represented in the model by 
the fact that disciplinary cases are declared “unfair” with probability d and 
therefore disciplinary cases are not costless, they cost dC, where C  is the 
severance payment for dismissals declared “unfair” . So, in our model, the 
parameter d will only affect permanent contracts14.
In this model, all workers are identical. Therefore, we are not consider­
ing the possible use of TC to observe worker’s characteristics. We assume
11 We are considering that indemnities, when the contract expires, are zero. Also, as 
temporary contracts can be made sufficiently short, we can assume realistically that they 
do not involve firing costs, because the firm always waits for the end of the contract 
whenever it wants to adjust employment.
12The terms redundancies and shocks axe used interchangeably in this chapter.
13As mentioned before, being TC sufficiently short, temporary workers are actually not 
renewed rather than being fired for other reasons. This implies that, in practice, temporary 
workers can never sue employers in court.
14 In Chapter 1, we also had that redundancies cost was zC , where z  > d because firms 
had greater chances to proof a truly disciplinary case than a hidden redundancy. As shown 
in Chapter 1, this cost is neutral on employment. Therefore, for simplicity, in this chapter 
we assume that z = 1.
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implicitly that the “trial” period of the contract has already elapsed and has 
been useful for this matter. As a consequence, there is no adverse selection 
problem but only a moral hazard one15.
In addition, workers are risk neutral and their instantaneous utility func­
tion is: U(w, e) =  w — e, where w is the wage and e is the effort. Workers’ 
effort choices are discrete. If they shirk, they expend zero effort and produc­
tion is zero. The effort required to perform in the job is e > 0. The effort is 
the same in any contract because there is only one type of job.
Every period, workers choose the level of effort that maximises their util­
ity actualised at rate r. We denote by VJt, i = {s, n], j  =  {P,T}, the present 
discounted utility of an employed worker with contract j  (P  for permanent 
contracts and T  for temporary contracts) at period t when shirking (i=s) or 
non shirking(i=n).
We analyse first a situation where only permanent contracts are available 
(section 2 .2 .1) and then a situation where both types of contracts are available 
(section 2 .2 .2).
2.2.1 Only perm anent contracts available
In this section, permanent contracts have the same characteristics as the 
contracts considered in Chapter 1. This model is just a discrete time version 
of that in the first chapter. In what follows, only the main equations will be 
displayed.
Non-shirking condition
Note that, since in our model, permanent contracts are assumed to have a 
stationary form16, we can omit time indices. When a worker does not shirk 
in a permanent contract, he gets a utility equal to:
V£ = wP - e  + - ! — [(l-b )V £  + b(Vu + C)] (2.1)
I +  r
where wp is the wage of a permanent contract and Vy is the present value 
of utility of an unemployed worker.
15In most countries, TC include a “trial” period with no costs of separation on either 
part, as in PC.
16For discussions of possible forms of bonding see Katz (1986).
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If the worker decides to shirk in a permanent contract, his utility is:
Wp +  ------ [(1 — b — q)Vp +  b(Vu +  C) 4- q{Vu T d(7)] (2.2)
1 + 7 ”
The worker will choose to provide an effort e if and only if V™ > V ‘. 
We can write this condition with equations (2.1) and (2 .2) and get the non­
shirking condition for a permanent contract, NSCp, in form of utilities:
V £ - V v > +d,C = K  (2.3)
Q
Substituting this condition in equation (2 .1), we get the incentive com­
patible wage in a permanent contract:
bC rVu nr(r + b) _ . .wP > e — — — +  — -  +  K  = wP (2.4)
1 +  r  1 +  r  (Id-7*)
If the permanent contract satisfies the NSCp, that is, if the worker is 
paid at least wp, or if being unemployed a is sufficiently large punishment 
(V? > Vu), the worker will choose to expend the effort e. We define Vp as 
the expected utility of a PC in equilibrium. The firm chooses the minimum 
wage at which the worker will not shirk, so that in equilibrium the NSCp  is 
binding and Vp =  Vp =  Vp.
Many countries have legal minimum wage constraints. Implicitly, we 
are assuming here that the legislated minimum wage would be a slack con­
straint. This will become more relevant in the next section where temporary 
contracts, which will be paid at the minimum wage level, are considered.
Hiring decisions
In this model, all firms are identical and infinitely lived. They chose employ­
ment to maximise the present discounted value of profits:
t= 0 0  2
M ax ^2  [f ( L Pt) -  wpLpt -  6CLp(t_i)] ^  +
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where Lp is employment in the system with only permanent contracts and 
f(L p )  is a CRS production function with f'(Lp) = m. In steady state17, 
labour demand is given by:
bCm = wp H  (2.5)
1 + r
Market equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each firm, taking as given all other firms’ wages and 
employment, finds it optimal to offer the going wage rather than a different 
wage. The key market variable that determines firm individual behaviour is 
the present value utility of an unemployed worker, Vu- Let a be the rate of 
exit from unemployment. We have:
Vu = —j -  [aVP + (1 -  a)Vu]1 + r
Given that the NSCp  is satisfied, we have that in equilibrium:
rVu = aK  (2.6)
Now, substituting equation (2.6) into equation (2.4), we get the efficiency 
wage curve in equilibrium:
&G Ty  (r +  b +  a) 
wP — e —  ----- + K 1~n r 1 (27 )
1 + r  (1 + 0
We derive aggregate employment, Lp, from the steady state flow condi­
tion. In steady state, inflows to unemployment are given by bLp. Outflows
are given by a(N  — Lp), where N  is the total of workers in the economy.
Thus,
a(N  — Lp) =  bLp (2*8)
Therefore,
Lp — — — (2.9)
CL +  0
17The steady state is reached after one period. For t = 0, employment is simply given 
by m  =  wp  since there axe no workers to be fired.
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Combining equations (2.5) and (2.7), we get that the equilibrium outflow 
rate of unemployment, a*, is given by:
m  = e + h '( L j b + f )  (2 .10)
(1 +  r)
The aggregate NSCp  can also be written in terms of the unemployment 
rate, u. Replacing equation (2.8) into equation (2.7),we get:
wp =  e —
1 +  r  (1 +  r)
bC (r +  b/u) , .
=  e —   + K \ ?  V  (2.11
1 +  r  (1 + r )  v '
where u =  (N  — Lp)/N  .
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), this expression shows the incompatibil­
ity of full employment with incentives18. This expression can be represented 
in the (wpt Lp) space. Figure 2.1 below shows the labour market equilibrium 
in the presence of (non-neutral) firing costs and compares it with the no firing 
cost situation. As discussed in the first chapter, firing costs reduce labour 
demand exactly by the expected cost of firing. In the context of imperfectly 
observable effort, a double moral hazard can arise. This makes shirking less 
costly and therefore the wage-setting curve shifts to the left. As a result, 
employment is lower than it would have been if there were no firing costs.
18As it will be shown, this is not necessarily the case when fixed-term contracts axe 
introduced.
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No firing costs
Non-neutral firing costs
L p(O0)
Figure 2.1: Market equilibrium with non-neutral firing costs
2.2.2 Temporary and permanent contracts available
For a given vacancy, firms can now choose among TC and PC. Permanent 
contracts look exactly the same as in the previous section. We now turn to 
the analysis of fixed-term contracts.
Non-shirking condition in a fixed-term  contract
Since fixed-term contracts have a non stationary form and this is precisely 
what will drive the results, it is convenient to use time indices to start 
analysing them. We now examine the incentive problem of a worker holding 
a fixed-term contract at period t which can be renewed into a permanent 
contract at period (t + 1) with probability R. If the contract is not renewed, 
the worker becomes unemployed. Thus, the incentive problem at (t +  1) 
is exactly the same as in a permanent contract. So, the non-shirking con­
straint of a fixed-term contract at {t + 1), NSCp^t+i), is just the non-shirking 
constraint of a permanent contract, i.e. NSCr(t+i) — NSCp.
Provided that the NSCr(t+i) is satisfied, then expected present discounted
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utility of being employed with a fixed-term contract at period t of not shirking 
and of shirking is given respectively by:
V£ =  wTt- e + j ^ - r [fl(l -  b)Vplt+1) + (b+ (1 -  fl)(l -  b))Vu[t+1)] (2 .12)
V f t  — w T t + 1 + r
R( 1 — b — q)Vp{t+1)+
(b +  (1 — i?)(l — b — q))Vu(t+1) +  qVu{t+i) (2.13)
where wp is the wage of the fixed-term contract and R  is the probability in 
which temporary contracts get renewed into permanent ones.
Again, shirking implies saving the disutility of effort today but implies 
a higher risk of becoming unemployed tomorrow. Moreover, in a fixed-term 
contract, not being caught shirking is a necessary condition in order to be 
renewed into a permanent contract. It has been assumed that all workers 
are identical and that there is a “hidden action” problem but not a “hidden 
information” one. Thus, in fixed-term contracts, expenditure of effort does 
not give any additional information about the worker’s characteristics that 
could influence renewal. But, expenditure of effort in a TC makes renewal 
more likely than when shirking. Not shirking reduces the probability to 
become unemployed directly.
A first important remark is that if there is no renewal of fixed-term con­
tracts into permanent contracts at the end of period t , then shirking is always 
strictly preferred (if R = 0, then Vpt — Vft = —e(l +  r) <0). The idea behind 
this is very simple: if a worker always becomes unemployed independently 
of the effort expended, there is no way to give incentives to the worker by 
paying him a higher wage. The only way to induce workers not to shirk in 
a fixed-term contract is that the firm commits to a sufficiently high renewal 
rate. In other words, firing won’t be automatic after the end of TC.
We are considering an extreme case where fixed-term contracts last only 
one period and thus the wage paid does not affect incentives19. But still, in
19Note that in the model we have assumed that TC last one period. This form of 
contract is not in itself restrictive. It allows permanent contracts to start with a TC. An 
incentive compatible contract would be in general one of stationary form. Firms could be 
choosing a chain of temporary contracts. But this contract would be equivalent to a PC 
of stationary form.
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a more general case, even if the fixed-term contract was longer, when unem­
ployment is certain at the end of the contract, wages have no incentive role. 
Instead, the prospects of renewal do. When it is uncertain for a worker that 
he will keep the job tomorrow, his preoccupation is with its renewal rather 
than its wage. Once there is no uncertainty about ending one’s contract (ex­
cept for exogenous reasons), then workers axe motivated by'the wage they 
get paid.
We can now calculate the condition that guarantees incentives to expend 
the effort in a fixed-term contract at period t, the non-shirking condition of 
a temporary contract at t , i.e. NSCrt •
v f, -  Vft > 0 if and only if R(VP{t+1) -  Vu(t+l)) > (2.14)
This condition states that incentives in a TC can be given by the renewal 
rate of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts (R ) and/or by the 
rent associated with holding a PC. Incentives given with future wages is the 
standard idea of efficiency wages. We can also study easily how the role of the 
renewal rate is related to the incentive problem: for given (Vp(i+1) —Vu(t+1)), 
we need R  to be higher, the higher the required effort (e); the more inefficient 
the control technology (<7); the higher the interest rate (r); and the higher 
the probability of exogenous redundancies(6).
So, we can see that, similarly to the efficiency wage of PC, the NSCxt in 
terms of the renewal rate R  (given the rent of PC) is stronger the higher the 
effort, the higher the interest rate, the lower the probability of detection of 
shirkers, the higher the exogenous shocks.
Note that the two mechanisms that can give incentives in a TC are sub­
stitutes: the higher the renewal rate, the lower the wage can be in PC given 
the incentive problem. And vice versa. However, note that for given per­
manent wages, the renewal rate cannot be zero, as we thought intuitively. 
Also, for given R , workers in a PC must enjoy some rent, as in the standard 
efficiency wage models. In figure 2 .2 , we represent the NSCrt in the space 
(R, V p -V u ).
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RNSCr  
-  Vp-Vu
Figure 2.2: Non-shirking condition of a temporary contract
An incentive compatible fixed-term contract must satisfy the NSCpt and 
the NSCp. We know from the previous section that in permanent contracts, 
workers are paid the minimum rent compatible with incentives, that is, the 
NSCp is binding. This reduces the possible values of R  to:
R  > n e(\ + r > = (2.i5)e(l + r) -f- qdC
In Figure 2.3, we represent the two non-shirking constraints of a fixed- 
term contract. The thicker line in the graph represents the combinations 
of (R , Vp — Vu) where the two N SC  are satisfied. And R* is the renewal 
rate for which both N SC  are binding. Note that for the case where d > 0, 
R* < 1. That is, if firing costs are non-neutral on permanent employment, 
the minimum incentive compatible renewal rate is less than one.
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R*
NSCr
Vp -Vv
Figure 2.3: Non-shirking conditions of a temporary contract
To conclude this section, it has been found that incentives in a TC are 
provided with a combination of a non-zero renewal rate into a PC and a 
non-zero rent paid in a PC. The rent is the minimal rent compatible with 
incentives given by the N SC p , and the renewal rate R  can take any value 
within the NSCpt compatible with such rent, that is R > R*. Let this 
condition be NSCp- Let Vp be the expected utility in equilibrium of a TC. 
Since Vp satisfies the NSCp, then Vp = V f.
In the next section we introduce the firm’s objective function and study 
the determination of R.
Choice of contracts in a two-tier system
We first analyse the choice of contracts for a given vacancy and then calculate 
in the next section the firm’s labour demand for the given (optimal) contract 
chosen.
When the firm hires a new worker, it can choose between a permanent 
contract or a fixed-term contract. The firm compares the present discounted 
value of marginal profits with the two different types of contracts taking 
into account their respective incentive constraints. Let 11^  be the present
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discounted value of marginal profits with type z contract (z =  T, P). We 
have:
— f'(L i) — Wu +  Y ^ r  
s.t. NSCu and NSC i{t+1)
where IT,i ( t + 1)
(1 — b)( 1 — i?)IlT(tH-i) +  (1 — 6)J?IIp(f+i) for i — T
-b C  +  (1 -  6)IIp(i+i) for i = P
Firms always get the net product instantaneously with any type of con­
tract. Then, with a permanent contract, the firm incurs the firing cost if there 
is a redundancy, otherwise the contract continues. Fixed-term contracts end 
after one period. If there is a shock, the contract does not continue and 
this is not costly for the firm. Otherwise, the contract continues, becoming 
a permanent one (with probability R) or restarting with a new worker with 
another fixed-term contract (with probability (1 — R)).
Lem m a 1 . The optimal contract in a two-tier system is a fixed-term 
contract that is renewed into a permanent contract with probability R.
Proof: It is easy to note that the permanent contract problem (z =  P) is 
just the subproblem at (t + 1) of the temporary contract problem (z =  T) at 
t. Since the wage in fixed-term contracts, wp, has no incentive role (implying 
that it will not be higher than the efficiency wage in a permanent contract) 
and there are no firing costs, the firm cannot be made worse off by starting 
with a fixed-term contract20. ■
Therefore, the optimal strategy for the firm is to start with a fixed-term 
contract and after one period renew it into a permanent contract with a 
certain probability R. The renewal rate is chosen to maximise the present 
discounted value of marginal profits of a TC (lip) subject to the N SC t • The
20If the wage in a TC is higher than in a PC then the two-tier system would not be an 
equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
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firm also chooses the wage to be paid during the fixed-term contract. For 
reasons that will become apparent, we consider two cases: (1) where wt is 
flexible and the firm only has to consider a participation constraint and (2) 
where there is some legislation that sets the wage at least at a minimum 
level, say wmin. In this case, the participation constraint is slack21.
The complete characterisation of the (optimal) TC is given by:
Max TLt (R ,w t)R,wt
r r * < r  <  i
; case (1): VT > V v 
/
case (2): wT > wmin
The resolution of this problem leads to the following proposition.
P roposition  1 I f  wages in fixed-term contracts are perfectly flexible, then 
the firm is indifferent among any incentive compatible renewal rate of fixed- 
term contracts into permanent contracts, that is R  6  (i2*,l). But if  there 
are minimum wage restrictions, then the firm chooses the minimum renewal 
rate, that is, R*.
Proof: see appendix.
The idea behind this result is simple. If wages in fixed-term contracts 
are perfectly flexible, all the effects of firing costs on the wage setting of 
the permanent contract can be undone with the wage of the first period 
while the worker is in a fixed-term contract. Thus the firm is indifferent 
among any renewal rate because profits can always be kept constant. In this 
case, the economy would be at full employment22. Instead, if wages are not
21 As mentioned, the legislated m inim um wage would be a slack constraint in the world 
with only permanent contracts. A further discussion on this is done in section (2.2.3) 
when the two systems are compared.
22To see how full employment can be reached in an efficiency wage model see Remark 1 
in section 2.2.2 where employment in a two-tier system is derived.
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perfectly flexible, the optimal rate of renewal is the minimum compatible 
with incentives, that is R*, where R* < 1. The mechanism that is preventing 
higher renewal rates is the non-neutral effect of firing costs on the efficiency 
wage. Figure 2.4 represents the iso-profits curves for the two cases in the 
space (R , Vp — Vy).
R* R*
case 2case 1
Figure 2.4: Optimal renewal rate with flexible and non flexible wages
Back to our initial question, note that this result provides an interesting 
and paradoxical explanation of the use of fixed-term contracts: when fixed- 
term contracts are very “cheap”, the firm is actually indifferent among TC 
or PC. While when TC are more “expensive”, the firm actually chooses the 
minimum share of PC given the incentive constraints.
H iring decisions
In this section we derive the labour demand for the optimal type of contract 
described in Proposition 1 (case 2)23. Firms maximise employment given the 
wage of TC (wmm) and renewal rate (R*) of this contract. Such a contract 
implies that the total workforce will be the sum of those workers with a TC
23As mentioned, there is full employment in case 1.
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(those who axe in the first period of their contract) and those with a PC. 
Workers with a PC are either those who have just been renewed from a TC 
or those who already had a PC and were not fired. To differentiate from the 
system in which only PC were available, we denote with the value of 
variables that were also present in that system (i.e. Lp, wp, a,Vu ). Thus we 
have:
Lpt — (1 — b)Lp{t-1) + R*( 1 — 6)Lp(i_i) Wt, t =  1 , +oo (2.16) 
and Lpo = 0 .
Firms maximise the present discounted value of profits subject to (2.16):
t= + o o  _  _  _  1
Max E [f(~L t) WmmLrt wpLpt b C L p ^ i ]  ^  +  ^
Lpt =  (1 — b)Lp(t-i) + R*{ 1 — b)Lp(t-1) (At)
s . t .  T  — 1  T— Ept +  Lpt
The first order conditions of this problem are:
[m -  u>min] -  J?*(l -  b )\{t+i) = 0  t = 0,..., Too (2.17)
and
m  — wp — bC 
I T  r (i
- r y  +  At — (1 — b)A(t+i) — 0 t — l , . . . ,Too (2. 18)
Combining equations (2.17) and (2.18) we can get an expression for the 
steady state labour demand:
m =  T (1 — P) wP T
bC 
I T  r
(2.19)
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where 0  = ----- , r t b,i— jtr +  6 + R*(l — b)
In a two-tier system, the marginal product of labour is equalised to a 
weighted sum of the marginal cost of a fixed-term contract arid the marginal 
cost of a permanent contract. The weights correspond to the actualised share 
of TC, (/?), and PC, (1 — /?), respectively. A more detailed discussion on /3 
is done in the next section.
M arket equilibrium
As before, the key market variable is Vy. In a two-tier system, all contracts 
start with a TC. Therefore,
Vv  =  - % V T (2.20)r + a
Replacing equation (2 .20) into equation (2 .12), we can solve for Vy in 
equilibrium:
rVy a
1 - f r  1 + r + a
(1 - 6) e(l +  r)
(«>m m  ~  e) +  V '   ^ ' (2 .21)(1 +  r) g
where the term e(l + r)/q  denotes the importance of the shirking problem 
in a TC, that is, R*(Vp — Vu), given by (2.14).
Now, going back to equation (2.4) we can get the efficiency wage of per­
manent contracts in a two-tier system:
bC (r +  6) awP — e —  ------ +    +1 +  7* 1 + r  ( 1 + r  +  a)
e(l -  6)
(^min T (2 .22)
As before, we derive L from the steady state flows conditions. The optimal 
contract described above implies that the steady state equilibrium can be 
reached in two periods. Let L  be total employment in the two-tier system, 
which equals temporary employment, Lp plus permanent employment, Lp. 
Inflows and outflows into employment have basically the same structure as 
in the system only with PC. There are also the flows from the renewal and 
non-renewals of TC. Figure 2.5 represents all these flows.
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(l-b)(l-R)Z.r
a(N-L)
UNEMPLOYMENT 
CN - L )
bL
EMPLOYMENT £,)
TEMPORARY 
(Lt ) •
T (l-b)R L t
PERMANENT
(L p )
Figure 2.5: Flows of the labour market in a two-tier system
In the steady state, the flow out of unemployment is given by a(N — L) 
workers. The flow into unemployment comes from those whose fixed-term 
contract are not renewed, (1 — 6)(1 — R *)L t, and from all those who lost 
their jobs for exogenous reasons, bL. We can thus write,
a(N - L t -  Lp) =  (1 -  R*)( 1 -  b)LT +  b(LT +  LP) (2.23)
At any time, a proportion R* of those fixed-term contracts that are not 
finished for exogenous reasons, are renewed into permanent contracts, while 
a proportion b of those already in permanent contracts become unemployed. 
So,
(1 -  b)R*LT = bLP 
Combining these two conditions we get:
abN
(2.24)
L t  = b+ a [b + {l-b )R * ]
f  (1 -  b)K  r
JbP  —  -------- ;--------L/t
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and
j  a N [ b + ( l - b ) B r ]
~  fc +  5 [ 6 + ( l - 6 ) ^ ]
Then we have that the proportion of fixed-term contracts is given by:
“  =  1 ( 2 - 2 5 )  6 +  (1 -  b)R' v '
and (1 — a) is the proportion of permanent contracts.
Combining (2.19) and (2.22) we get that the equilibrium outflow rate of 
unemployment in a two-tier system, a*, is given by:
m = (3wxnin +  (1 -  (3)
Tyrr + b a* (  e(l —b)
e  K  - — ;-------- h  — — ; " 7 3 7 7  I ^ m in  — C +
1 +  r  ( l + r  +  a*)V q
(2.26)
Going back to the efficiency wage in the two-tier system, we can express 
(2.22) in terms of the unemployment rate. This allows us to do the following 
remark. Replacing (2.24) into (2.23), we get:
_ a ( l  -  u)
a = ------------u
where u =  (N — Lt ~L p ) /N  is the unemployment rate in the two-tier system. 
So, the efficiency wage curve in equilibrium is given by:
bC (r +  &) q (1 — it) (  e ( l - b ) \
w p  — e ~  t—— -^-------------H— t,--- ~n \ ( ^min — e H------------- I1 +  r  (Id -7*) a (l — u) + u (l + r) \  q J
(2.27)
R em ark  1 Full employment is not incompatible with the incentive problem 
in a two-tier system as it is in the system with only one type of contract 
(as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984))• But it would always be a “mixed” full 
employment, i.e. full employment in which TC and PC coexist.
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This can be seen directly from expression (2.27): the incentive compatible 
wage for zero unemployment rate is finite24. This is in sharp contrast from 
the situation with only permanent contracts (see equation (2.11)). However, 
this full employment would be ‘mixed’, in other words, with both types 
of contracts coexisting25. In this case, full employment is compatible with 
incentives. The reason is that each type of employment gives incentives to 
the other: temporary workers are motivated by the possibility of getting a 
permanent contract and permanent workers are motivated to work in order 
to avoid restarting with a fixed-term contract.
2.2.3 Comparing two systems: two-tier vs. only per­
manent contracts
In this section we compare employment levels and the effects of firing costs 
in each system. We start with the equilibrium conditions for each system.
For a system to be an equilibrium, it has to be the case that firms cannot 
make higher profits by offering the other type of contract within that system.
Lem m a 2. The equilibrium conditions for each system depend on the 
level of minimum wages.
Proof: see appendix.
P roposition  2 For wmin > m, the system with only permanent contracts is 
the only equilibrium. For wmin < m, the two-tier system is the only equilib­
rium. For iumin =  m, any of the two systems can be an equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix
The idea behind this result is that given that in the system with only PC 
workers are paid their marginal product, when the minimum wage is above 
m, fixed-term contracts are more costly than permanent contracts so firms 
would offer permanent contracts only. On the contrary, when the minimum 
wage is below 777, offering fixed-term contracts is profitable and firms end up 
in a two-tier system. For the case where the minimum wage is exactly m, 
any contract has the same cost and both systems generate the same profits 
so either of the two systems could be an equilibrium.
24From Proposition 1, we have that in case 1, for any combination of ( w t ,  R), a  — * oo.
25All jobs start with a TC and then become a PC.
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Em ploym ent levels
It is important to know if the introduction of TC generates higher employ­
ment or not despite the fact that, in general, it creates a higher segmentation 
of the labour market (except for R  =  1 where TC can be just considered as 
a “first step” to PC).
Comparing (2.26) with (2.10), it is possible to distinguish two effects 
at play. On the one hand, for given wages, due to the composition ef­
fect mentioned before, employment is higher in a two-tier system. Note 
that the weight (3 corresponds to an actualised share of TC given by a 
(equation (2.25))26.
On the other hand, wP is not necessarily equal to w*P. This also has 
an effect on employment. If wages of permanent contracts are higher in a 
two-tier system than in a system with only PC, ceteris paribus, employment 
would be lower in a two-tier system.
Lem m a 3. The difference in employment levels in the two systems de­
pends on wmin.
Proof: see appendix
Intuitively, the composition effect is lower the higher the minimum wage 
is. Note that for any wm-m > 0, the share of TC in the economy is constant 
(from Proposition 1) and therefore increases of the minimum wage are not 
compensated by a reduction of fixed-term contracts. At the same time, the 
difference in permanent contract wages in the two systems also depends on 
the level of minimum wages. The higher the minimum wage, the higher 
the permanent wage in the two-tier system27. This, in turn, also reduces 
employment in the two-tier system.
So, the effect of TC on employment depends crucially on the level of min­
imum wages. Therefore, a two-tier system does not guarantee higher levels 
of employment. More precisely, we can formulate the following proposition:
^  Also, if r = +oo, thenwp +26 Notice that if r = 0, then f ' ( L ) = ocwmin -f- (1—ot) .
1 + r
f ' ( L ) =  wmin. That is, if firms axe patient, they equalise the marginal product of labour 
to the average cost of labour. In the opposite extreme case, firms only perceive the cost 
of the present labour force which is always holding a TC.
27This comes from the fact that in the two-tier system all contracts start being TC 
which are paid at the minimum wage.
60
Proposition  3 For wmjn >w^]n, employment is higher in the system with 
only permanent contracts. Moreover, there is a range of values of wmm, 
namely wm\n € (wj,in,ra), f or which employment is higher in a system with 
only permanent contracts, and the minimum wage constraint corresponding 
to wmin is slack in the system with only PC.
Proof: see appendix.
The idea is that for high enough minimum wages, the fact that a two- 
tier system has less permanent workers is not compensated by their higher 
labour cost. The interest of the result is that the wm-m is high enough to make 
employment in the two-tier system lower, but it is not so high to as to make 
directly labour costs higher in the two-tier system. Indeed, it is possible to 
have higher employment in the system with only PC even though PC are still 
paid above the minimum wage constraint. That is, the composition effect is 
not eliminated.
Now, the question is: Is it always the case that a system is an equilibrium 
when employment is higher in that system? The study of this question gives 
the following proposition:
P roposition  4 When the system with only PC is an equilibrium, employ­
ment is always higher in such a system. But there is a range of minimum 
wages, wm\n 6 (w ^ ,  ra), for which employment is higher in a system with 
only PC even though a two-tier system is the resulting equilibrium. In this 
range, the minimum wage constraint corresponding to wmin is always slack in 
the system with only PC.
Proof: see appendix.
When firms chose PC it is because TC are too expensive. By the same 
token, the two-tier system would generate lower employment and the system 
with only PC (which generates higher employment) is the only equilibrium. 
The mechanism behind is that when the minimum wage is low enough, firms 
do not take into account that by using TC (and not PC directly) they hire 
more, increasing a, and therefore increasing wp so much that total employ­
ment turns out to be lower than it would have been with only PC.
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Effects of firing costs in a  tw o-tier system
In the system with only PC, the effect of firing costs was clear-cut: their non­
neutral effect on the wage setting reduced employment. Given the results on 
employment in a two-tier system found in the last section, it is interesting to 
analyse the effects of firing costs in the two-tier system. That is, are firing 
costs neutral in a two-tier system despite the fact that the sign of employment 
is ambiguous?
In the two-tier system, firing costs also reduce employment, but it is im­
portant to distinguish two effects. First, they reduce employment just like 
in the system with only PC because of their positive effect on permanent 
contract wages. Note that this effect is lower than in the other system since 
the proportion of permanent employment is in general lower. Second, firing 
costs also play a role in the determination of the renewal rate. The higher 
the rent in PC (due to the effect of firing costs), the lower incentive com­
patible renewal rate, R *, needs to be28. This reduces the above effect. That 
is, employment is less reduced. The question then is: does it eliminate it 
completely?
Proposition  5 The neutrality of firing costs cannot be restored with the in­
troduction of fixed-term contracts for any imperfectly flexible temporary wage.
Proof: see appendix.
The intuition is that the incentive problem imposes a minimum propor­
tion of permanent employment and that its costs can only be compensated 
at the expense of lower wages for temporary workers. But, as it is shown, 
there is no positive temporary wage that can undo the effect of firing costs.
This means that the introduction of TC may imply higher employment 
despite the fact that it does not remove the inefficiency of firing costs com­
pletely. What happens then when the non-neutrality effect of firing costs is 
reduced? That is, what happens if d is reduced? In the system with only PC, 
employment increases. In the two-tier system, employment also increases as 
well as the renewal rate of fixed-term contracts. So, the labour market is less 
segmented. This explains why the introduction of TC keeping PC unchanged
28This effect could make insiders holding a PC push for higher firing costs and firms 
accept it since it would allow them to offer lower renewal rates to new entrants with TC.
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(that is,leaving the non-neutral effects of firing costs unchanged) leads to a 
substitution of TC for PC without a necessary increase of total employment. 
Therefore, the removal of the non-neutrality effects of firing costs is an ef­
ficient policy. Whether it would have more impact effect in one system or 
the other depends again in the level of minimum wages that determine the 
difference in employment in both systems.
2.2.4 Welfare Analysis
We want to see if the equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto efficient or 
not. The social planner maximises aggregate welfare:
W  = Lp(VP +  Up) +  Lt (Vt +  nT) + (N  -  L)Vv
In steady state, the inflows and outflows from each group are such that 
maximising aggregate welfare across agents is equivalent as maximising the 
expected utility of a representative individual that gets all the resources in 
the economy, that is:
Lp{wp — e) T Lt (wt — c) T Lp(rn — ryp) -1- Lp{rn — 'Wp) 
which in turn equals:
LP(m — e) + LT(m — e) = L(m  — e)
that is, total output minus the social cost of production (the effort, e).
Thus, the central planner is only concerned with total employment. There­
fore, from Proposition 3, the market outcome is not efficient because choosing 
the PC only system implies higher employment but the market equilibrium 
is the two-tier system. Then, in a two-tier system, what is the optimal social 
renewal rate of TC?
The social planner maximises employment in a two-tier system subject to 
the NSC’s and the minimum wage constraint. Moreover, the social allocation 
must be profitable from the private point of view, that is aggregate profits 
must be non-negative. So, the social planner solves:
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s.t. <
Max (m -  e)L{aiR)R,a,WT,Wp
R > R *  (Ax)
R  < 1 (A2)
bCwP - e  + — -  1 +  r - K
(r + 6) a
( 1 + r )  1 +  r  + ai t ?  j
—  — (3 w t — ( 1  — P ) w p  >  0  ( A 4 )  
k VJp ^  ^min (A5)
R( 1 -  b)K wT - e +  \ 1 + r > 0 (A3)
The resolution of this problem leads to the following proposition:
P roposition  6 Forwmin 6 (^mim771)* market equilibrium is not efficient 
from a social point of view. In this interval, the optimal renewal rate of 
fixed-term contracts is R  — 1.
Proof: see appendix.
Thus from the social point of view, there are gains from reducing the 
segmentation of the labour market because this increases total employment. 
The intuition is the following. Firms do not take into account that when 
they increase the rate of renewal, permanent wages will fall. Thus, they 
chose the minimum incentive compatible renewal rate because they take as 
given permanent wages.
2.3 Conclusion
We have analysed the introduction of fixed-term contracts in an economy 
where firing costs reduce employment. The chapter has shown that the choice 
of fixed-term contracts is understandable even in a context of efficiency wages. 
The idea is that the renewal rate into permanent contracts has an incentive 
role. In addition, renewal rates are lower the higher the (negative) effect of 
firing costs on employment.
It is often stated that the argument for introducing fixed-term contracts is 
that this is “the price to pay to get full employment”. But higher employment 
at the expense of segmentation of the labour market only arises if wages 
are very flexible. Otherwise, employment is not necessarily higher than in
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a system with only permanent contracts while the labour market becomes 
segmented. The idea is that perfect wage flexibility would be required in 
order for fixed-term contracts to eliminate the non-neutrality effect of firing 
costs.
This can explain why the introduction of fixed-term contracts keeping 
permanent contracts unchanged (that is, leaving the non-neutral effects of 
firing costs unchanged) leads to a substitution of fixed-term for permanent 
contracts without a necessary increase of total employment as we have seen 
in some European countries.
Moreover, from the social point of view, market segmentation is too large. 
Higher renewal rates of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead 
to higher employment levels. This analysis suggests that, policies on the 
employment protection legislation tackling the core labour contracts can be 
more efficient in motivating the creation of employment and, more precisely, 
the creation of permanent employment.
Once the effects of introducing fixed-term contracts on employment have 
been analysed it remains to study their effects on other dimensions of the 
labour market. This is important in order to understand if the introduction 
of fixed-term contracts help the labour market work better despite their 
impact on employment. The next two chapters study empirical issues of the 
introduction if fixed-term contracts. In particular, the next chapter looks 
at the determinants of the transition of fixed-term contracts into permanent 
ones for the Spanish case.
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2.4 Appendix
2.4.1 P roof of proposition 1
Proof. We first analyse case 1 and then case 2.
• In case 1, the firm chooses to pay the lowest wage that satisfies the
participation constraint, that is Wt such that VT =  Vu- Using equation (2.12)
we have that, in equilibrium, this wage is given by:
wt ~  e — —^-R(Vp — Vu)1 + r
So, Wt  =  wT(R, Vu, Vp).
Thrrrfnrr ^ T ^ ’W T i R , 9 U T d UT d w TTherefore,------------------   =  —  +  — — .
And, sign{ ^ T{R' Wg T^ R ' ' )' ' )\  = sign ((lip -  IIr ) +  (Vp -  Vv ) ) .
The first element (lip — lip) shows the direct effect of the renewal rate 
on temporary profits: every contract renewed gives lip instead of lip. The 
second element shows the indirect effect of the renewal rate through the wage 
setting in fixed-term contracts: an increase in the renewal rate implies an 
increase of the utility of holding a fixed-term contract proportional to the rent 
in permanent contracts, (Vp — Vu), which allows to reach the participation 
constraint with a reduction of the wage in fixed-term contracts (and therefore 
increase profits) by the same amount.
We can rewrite the above expression in terms of total surplus, Si, of a 
match with the current worker on a PC or on a TC, that is, S* =  II* +  V* for 
i = {P ,T}.
sign ((lip — lip) +  (Vp — Vu)) = sign (Sp — St +  Vp — Vu)
where,
Sp =  m  — e +    [bVu +  (1 — &)<Sp] and
1 + r
ST =  m -  e +  — [1W„ + (1 -  b)RSP +  (1 -  6)(1 -  R)(Vu +  IIT)]1 + r
The difference in surplus among the different contracts depends crucially 
on the renewal rate and on the fact that TC can only be used once on the same 
worker. If the renewal rate is 1, then fixed-term contracts and permanent
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contracts generate the same total surplus. Their difference is just in the 
distribution of this surplus among current worker and employer. Secondly, 
the fact that fixed-term contracts can only be used once on the same worker 
implies a change of utility (from holding a TC to becoming unemployed) for 
current workers holding a fixed-term contract whenever they are not renewed. 
Therefore we get:
sign (SP -  ST) = sign [(1 -  6)(1 -  R) (VT -  Vv )} 
and therefore,
sign((UP -  Hr) +  (VP -  Vu)) =  sign [(1 -  6)(1 -  R) (VT -  Vv)]
The fact that firm chooses the wage such that Vp = Vu, implies that 
. _ J d H T(R ,wT(R))\  n
9 ( dR J
Therefore, the firm is indifferent among any incentive compatible R. ■ 
Note that from the whole economy point of view the two types of contracts 
also generate the same surplus because when a fixed-term contract is not 
renewed, the firm starts a new one with another worker. The intuition for 
this is simple: there is only one type of job in the economy and workers are 
all homogeneous. Globally, the different contracts just determine a different 
distribution of surplus among workers and employers.
• In case 2, the wage for fixed-term contracts is fixed exogenously and 
we only have a direct effect of the renewal rate on temporary profits. That 
is:
( dUT(R, wT) \  Nsign I  — ------ 1 =  sign (lip -  IIr )
bC .sign (lip — lip) =  sign(wT — wp —  ------) < 0, since wp < Wp.1 +  r
So, the firm chooses the minimal rate of renewal that is incentive compatible.
2.4.2 P roof o f lemma 2 
Proof. :
• A system with only PC is an equilibrium iff:
UP(w p)> U T(wmin,R%Iip(idp)) (2.28)
• A two-tier system is an equilibrium iff:
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nr(w min,-R*, np(wp)) > Up(wp) 
Condition (2.28) is satisfied iff wm\n > w* <=$■ wm\n > m
(2.29)
Condition
^min ^  ^  ®
Tfl — 3w *(2.29) is satisfied iff wm-m < w* <==>■ wmm < — .-----------<==>
2.4.3 P roof of proposition 2
Proof. : From lemma 2 we have that for every value of wm-m the equilibrium
is defined as follows:
• if wmin < m, the two-tier system is an equilibrium.
• if itfmin =  77i, any of the two systems can be an equilibrium.
• if wmin > 77i, the system with only PC is an equilibrium.
■
2.4.4 P roof of lemma 3
Proof. : Employment in each system is given, respectively:
aN
and
From equation (2.10), a —
~ 51\T[6+( l -6) i r ]
”  & +  2 [ & + ( l - 6)ifr]
(m — e)(l -I- r) — K (r + b) _  J
K
where
K '
_ X(1 + r)From equation (2.26), a =  —j — ~^L
X  =
J  -  p  J
[(Wmin -  e)(l +  r) +  (1 -  b)RK] (1 -  0)
and J  =  J  +  (m -  wm]n)(l +  r).
The difference in employment in the two systems is given by: 
sign(Lp — L) — sign[a — a [6 +  (1 — 6)i?]), where a =  a(wmjn).
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We have that: if wm]n =  w ^[n = »  \l p -  L(w*m j ]  = 0, where
, JG +  \pe(l +  r) +  pK {r + b)]G+ Je{ 1 -  p)(l +  r) -  J (  1 -  /?)iLK(l -  b)
Wmin[ } ( l+ r ) [ J ( l - P ) + p G \
and G = K  [b +  (1 -  b)R] (1 +  r) +  J.
So,
• if Wmin > Wmin> Lp > L
• if Wmin < Lp < L 
■
• It is easy to check that w ^in > 0.
First, note that since K  > 0 then J  > 0. Then, the sign of w^in depends 
on whether its numerator is positive or not. Let’s just take the first and the 
last elements of the numerator (the rest is a positive number): 
sign fc in (^ )] =  si9n [ J G -  J{ 1 -  (3)RK{ 1 -  b)] = 
sign [Kb{ 1 +  r) +  K R ( 1 -  b)(l +  r)  -  (1 -  P)RK{ 1 -  6)] =  
sign [Kb( 1 +  r) +  — b) +  i f  (1 — 6)(1 +  r  — 1)] =
sign [#6(1 +  r) +  pR K {\ - b )  + K (  1 -  6)r] > 0 
So,w*m.m > 0 V R e ( R \ l ) .
2.4.5 P roof of Proposition 3 
Proof. :
• From Lemma 3, if wm\n > ^min = >  Lp > L
• To check if the minimum wage constraint is binding in the system with 
only permanent contracts, we need to calculate: w*P — w^in.
sign{ w'p -  w*min) = sign{m -  to V j =
m J{  1 +  r)( l -  0) +  m/?( 1 +  r)G - G J -  pGe{\ +  r) -  0GK{r +  b) 
- J e (  1 -  /3)(1 +  r) +  J( 1 -  ff)RK{ 1 -  6) 
m J(l +  r)(l  — p )  +  mfi( 1 +  r)G — GJ — 0Ge( 1 +  r) — (3GK(r +  b)
+ J { e/ q  — e)( l  +  r )( l  — P)
sign [Jm (l 4- r)( l  — 0) + (3GJ — G J  +  J(e/q  — e)(l +  r)(l  — (3)\ = 
sign [m{ 1 +  r) — G +  (e/q — e)(l +  r*)] =  
sign \{e/q){ 1 +  r) -  K{1 +  r) [b +  (1 — b)R] + K (r  +  b)] = 
sign [{e/q)(\ +  r) +  K r( 1 — b) — KR*(1 — 6)(1 +  r)] =  
sign [(e/g)(l +  r) +  Kr{ 1 — b)( 1 — R*) — KR*{ 1 — 6)] =  
sign [(e/g)(l +  r)b -F Kr{ 1 — 6)(1 — -R*)] > 0
sign
sign
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Since u)p — w ^in > 0, then for wmin G (w ^n,m), we have that LP > L 
and iymin not binding in the system with only PC. ■
2.4.6 P roof of Proposition 4
• Prom proposition 2 , the system with PC only is an equilibrium if
lUmin > rn. From lemma 3, employment in is this system is higher if wmin > 
^min- I^om proposition 3, we know that m > w^-n. This implies that when­
ever the system with PC only is an equilibrium, employment is always higher 
in that system. ■
• Prom proposition 2, the two-tier system is an equilibrium if wmjn < m. 
Prom lemma 3, if wm;n G m) employment is lower in this system.
Therefore it is this same range of wm\n for which the two-tier system is an 
equilibrium despite the fact that employment in the two-tier system is lower 
and the minimum wage constraint is not binding in the system with only 
PC. ■
2.4.7 P roof of Proposition 5
Proof. : We analyse the effects of F  (the non-neutral firing cost, F = dC) 
on employment in the two-tier system:
• =  si9n
OR* n 
dF
.  s i g n ( ^ )  =
sign ( r +  &)( 1 - 0 ) -
dp (m -  wmin) (1 +  r)
dF 1 ~ P
(1 - P ) ( l  + r) Wmin 6+ (1  -  b)e/q
For all the cases where the two-tier system is an equilibrium, we have
dQthat m  — wm\n > 0. Also, we have that —- > 0. Therefore, the first term indF
square brackets is non-negative. Note that from proposition 1 we can write: 
Wmin =  e — (1 — b)e/q + A, where A > 0 in case 2 (and A  < 0 in case 1). This
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makes the second term in square brockets be positive in case 2 . Therefore, 
da
—— < 0 m case 2. dF
dL '
Thus, ■—  < 0, in case 2. That is, for all wmjn in case 2 , firing costs reduce or
employment. ■
2.4.8 Proof of Proposition 6
The first order conditions of the social planner problem are:
(1) * :
t \ \ \ \\m  ~  +  A i  -  A 2 -  A.dR
dP
a (1 — b)R 
1 +  r  +  a 1 + r
+A4 ~Q^Wp ~ W t) ~  ®
dL wt — e +
(1 -  b)RK
(2) a: ( m -  e)—  -  A3
(3) wP : X3 -  A4(l -  P) = 0
1 +  r (1 + r )
(1 +  r  +  a): =  0
(4) wp : A5 — Ac a
1 + r  +  a 
where,
dL a( 1 -  b)Nb
d R ~  (b + ab + a ( l - b ) R )2 
dL _  [ b+ ( l - b ) R ] N b
da (b +  ab +  a(l — b)R)2
dLP Nb{ 1 -  b)R
-  x4p = 0
dLT
dR  a'dR 
dLT
dL dLP dL
dR (' l + a)dR
da (b +  ab +  a(l — b)R)2
da (b +  ab +  a(l — b)R)2
• Conditions (3) and (4) imply that either A3 =  A4 =  A5 =  0 or A3 > 0, 
A4 > 0, and A5 > 0. The first case implies a contradiction (from (2), R  would 
be negative). Therefore these multipliers are positive implying that the three 
constraints associated are binding.
• It then is easy to check that for wmin € {w^inim) , Z(l ,a( l))  > 
L(R*,a(R*)). Therefore, the optimal renewal rate from a social point of 
view is R  = 1. ■
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Chapter 3
The transition of workers from  
tem porary to perm anent 
employment: the Spanish case
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the use of fixed-term (or temporary, TC) contracts1 
in Spain. This country is often thought of as an economy with highly regu­
lated labour markets, and most aggregate indices of flexibility tend to rank 
the country at the bottom of the list of OECD economies (see Grubb and 
Wells, 1993 and 1994b). Spanish unemployment, at over 20% of the labour 
force, reinforced this belief among both experts and employers. This situa­
tion probably triggered the implementation of the experiment of flexibility at 
the margin, which started in 1984 with the introduction of a new typology of 
labour contract, characterised by limited duration and negligible firing costs. 
The idea behind this policy was to introduce more flexible contracts than 
the existing (permanent) ones, in order to fight high and persistent levels of 
unemployment2.
These contracts have been massively used for nearly all types of jobs
1 These two terms will be used equivalently.
2Saint-Paul (1993, 1996b) discusses the political economy of labour market institu­
tions and argues how two-tier systems are policies which generate consensus between the 
employed and the unemployed.
72
and sectors of the economy. Soon after their introduction - coinciding with 
the expansion of the late 1980s - 98% of newly registered contracts have 
been of this type (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). But, at the same 
time, unemployment has remained as high as before the reform. Within 
a decade, the Spanish labour market has experienced record rates of gross 
job creation, but little permanent employment has been created because 
only a small proportion of fixed-term contracts has been converted on a 
permanent basis3. The labour market has gradually evolved towards a dual 
structure4, with two thirds of employees retaining a permanent status and 
the rest working in a highly mobile market. Indeed, the share of temporary 
workers has increased to approximately one third by the early 1990s - which 
is more than three times the European average (see OECD 1987, 1993 and 
Toharia 1997).
The recent literature has evaluated various labour market effects of the 
introduction of fixed-term contracts. Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and Bento­
lila and Dolado (1994) point at the perverse effects of fixed-term contracts 
on wage formation. Their argument is that, when wage setting is dominated 
by insider employees, protected by substantial turnover costs, permanent 
workers may be able to obtain higher wages, “since the presence of a buffer 
of flexible employees lowers the likelihood that insiders will lose their jobs”. 
Jimeno and Toharia (1996) look instead at the effects of fixed-term contracts 
on labour productivity. On the one hand, with shorter employment relation­
ships, firms’ and workers’ incentive to invest in specific human capital are 
reduced. On the other hand, the dependence of severance payments on the 
tenure of the contract may lead temporary employees to exert higher effort 
than permanent ones.
Here we propose to investigate whether the limited success of higher flex­
ibility at the margin is linked to a growing labour market segmentation, with 
nearly 35% of workers reshuffling themselves among a given number of tem­
porary jobs. If this is the case, policies aimed at improving labour market 
flexibility in Spain as well in the rest of Europe and, more generally, at facing 
the European unemployment problem, should be targeted at the core rather 
than at the fringe of labour contracts. This also seems to be the view of
3See Figure 3.4.
4See Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Castillo et al. (1998), Saint-Paul (1996a), Segura et 
al. (1991), and Toharia (1997).
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Figure 3.1: The share of fixed-term contracts (%) in total employment, 1987- 
1997. Source: EPA.
Spanish policy makers, that more recently tried to limit the applicability 
of fixed-term contracts (1994 reform) and created a new type of permanent 
contract with lower firing costs (1997 reform).
More specifically, we study the duration pattern of fixed-term contracts 
using micro data drawn from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA). This 
should shed some light on the kind of use that employers make of this 
instrument5.
Before 1984, the use of fixed-term contracts was only allowed in Spain 
for covering jobs whose underlying nature was seasonal, or linked to specific 
(temporary) activities. One key feature of the 1984 reform was to remove 
the seasonal requirement for the applicability of fixed-term contracts. And 
indeed they spread rapidly to non-seasonal jobs (see Figure 3.1). This leads 
us to analyse alternative reasons why firms opt for temporary hirings.
5See also OECD (1993) for a discussion on this issue.
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First, fixed-term contracts can be used as a screening device, that allows 
employers to observe the productivity of the job-worker pair during the max­
imum probation period of three years. In this perspective, job matches are 
interpreted as “experience goods” , in the tradition of Jovanovic (1979, 1984). 
These models precisely assume that “the only way to determine the quality 
of a particular match is to form the match and experience it” . In a high- 
firing-cost scenario, the introduction of fixed-term contracts would therefore 
provide employers with the adequate instrument for experiencing the quality 
of a match by means of hiring.
Second, even when the quality of a job-worker pair is directly observ­
able before forming the match, employers can opt for fixed-term contracts 
as a more flexible option for adjusting employrhent in the face of adverse 
shocks to the firm, and as a cheaper factor of production. Jimeno and To- 
haria (1993) find in fact that temporary workers earn approximately 10% 
less than permanent ones, after controlling for observable personal and job 
characteristics.
We can in principle discriminate between these two different uses of tem­
porary contracts by analysing the time pattern of the rate at which firms con­
vert fixed-term into permanent contracts within the (legal) maximum spell of 
3 years since their start. This reveals whether temporary employment is used 
as a genuine probation period that may end up in permanent employment 
at any time during the 3 years, or whether firms opt for permanent employ­
ment only when there is no other way to retain the worker. In the latter 
case we would observe that fixed-term contracts tend to be transformed into 
permanent ones towards the 3 years’ duration limit. The technique that we 
use for this task is a duration model for temporary employment, with com­
peting risks of flowing into permanent employment versus non-employment 
or a new temporary contract, and sufficiently flexible duration dependence 
for the exit into permanent employment. This highlights the behaviour of 
the hazard during the whole duration of temporary employment.
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is both method­
ological and related to the use of the EPA data base. We believe that the 
use of duration models best describes the dynamics of the transition process 
between temporary and permanent employment. Such models in fact exploit 
the potential strength of a cohort panel study, which is the possibility of 
being able to track individuals over time and observe exactly how long they 
take to make an employment change. Moreover, the use of individual infor­
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mation on workers’ human capital that can be obtained from the EPA shows 
whether the prospect of permanent employment is shared among temporary 
workers, and to what extent there are some categories that are more likely 
than others to remain trapped in temporary jobs.
The existing literature has not put both these things together. Existing 
contributions on renewal rates (see Toharia 1996 and Alba 1998) generally 
use logit models to analyse the determinants of the probability of receiving 
a permanent contract, conditional on being initially hired on a temporary 
basis. Logit specifications may prove rather inflexible when applied to the 
analysis of the dynamic path of transition rates. Garcia-Fontes and Hopen- 
hayn (1996) estimate a duration model of job tenure using the Social Security 
records. These data avoid the use of self-reported information on the dura­
tion of contracts, and therefore have the advantage of reducing measurement 
error, but on the other hand they provide very little information on work­
ers’ characteristics, and do not allow to identify the temporary/permanent 
nature of the contract held.
The chapter maps out as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data that 
we use, extracted from the panel version of the EPA. Section 3.3 provides a 
discrete time duration model, that applies to the transition of workers out of 
temporary employment. Section 3.4 presents our results. Section 3.5 finally 
concludes.
3.2 The data
The data used in this chapter is drawn from the Spanish Labour Force Sur­
vey (Encuesta de la Poblacion Activa), which is carried out every quarter on 
a sample of some 60,000 households. The EPA is designed to be representa­
tive of the total Spanish population, and contains very detailed information 
about labour force status of individuals. Each household can remain in the 
survey for a maximum of six consecutive quarters: each quarter a new co­
hort is selected, and one sixth of households leave the sample. Labour force 
transitions can be analysed by using the panel structure of the survey (EPA 
enlazada), available for all cohorts that entered the survey since 1987.
Our sample includes individuals belonging to cohorts that entered the 
survey between 1987:2 and 1996:3, covering (more than) a full cycle of the 
Spanish economy. We select all respondents who completed six quarterly
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interviews, and declared to hold a fixed-term contract in any of the six in­
terviews.
We disaggregate our observations in four broad sectors: agriculture, man­
ufacturing, construction and services. Figure 3.2 plots the share of fixed-term 
contracts over time of each sector6. It shows that the share of seasonal con­
tracts among all fixed-term ones is only significant in agriculture.
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Figure 3.2: The share of seasonal contracts in total fixed-term contracts,
by sectors. Source: EPA.
Another way to check for any evident pattern of seasonality is by looking 
at the absolute number of existing fixed-term contracts within each sector. 
This is done in Figure 3.3. Again, except in agriculture, seasonality does not 
play too strong a role in shaping the evolution of temporary employment.
6The plot refers to the sample period 1988:3-1996:3, in order to have 6 cohorts of 
workers present in the survey at all times.
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Figure 3.3: The number of existing fixed-term contracts, 
by sector. Source: EPA.
In order to give a flavour of labour market transitions in our sample, 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report quarterly and yearly transition probabilities across 
three labour market states: non-employment, permanent employment, and 
temporary employment. Both tables display extremely strong persistence in 
the non-employment and the permanent employment states. As expected, 
the temporary employment category displays significant turnover, although 
most of such mobility represents reshuffling across temporary contracts, as 
shown in the bottom row of Table 3.2.
7 8
Table 3.1: Quarterly transitions across labour market states
quarter t 4- 1
NE PC new TC same TC
NE 96.64 0.67 2.69 
1.94 95.12 2.94 
18.24 6.49 16.9 58.37
quarter t PC
TC
Notes. Transition rates are computed according to the distri­
bution of individuals across labour market states at quarter 
t + 1, conditional on their status at quarter t (Source: EPA).
Table 3.2: Yearly transitions across labour market states
year t +  1
NE PC new TC same TC
NE 93.67 1.33 5.00 
7.35 89.47 3.18 
26.39 10.83 49.91 12.87
year t PC
TC
Notes. Transition rates are computed according to the distri­
bution of individuals across labour market states at quarter 
t + 4, conditional on their status at quarter t (Source: EPA).
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In our duration model, we concentrate on individual transitions out of 
the first fixed-term contract that is observed during the survey period. This 
leaves us with 118,197 temporary employment spells.
The duration of each contract is constructed in the following way. Given 
that no contract identifier is supplied, in order to follow each single fixed-term 
contract across interviews we rely on self-reported information on (i) the type 
of contract held and (ii) the uncompleted duration of the present contract. 
The type of contract held can be permanent or fixed-term. The uncompleted 
duration of the present contract is expected to rise across interviews with 
calendar time, and to drop to zero whenever there is a contract switch. We 
therefore consider a spell of temporary employment as completed when either 
there is a change in the type of contract or there is a drop in the uncompleted 
duration of the present contract.7
Roughly 65% of temporary employment spells that we observe started 
during the survey period. The remaining 35% started before the worker was 
selected for the survey, so that we need to condition on the length of tempo­
rary employment at the first interview date, using once more the information 
on the elapsed duration of the current contract that is reported at the first 
interview. The self-reported elapsed duration up to the interview date is 
measured in months if it is lower than one year, and in years if it is longer. 
Whenever the reported elapsed duration is 1 year, this means anything be­
tween 4 and 8 quarters, and we assign to these observations the mean value 
of 6 quarters. Similarly, we assign the mean value of 10 quarters to reported 
durations of 2 years. Such data bunching problem could be eliminated by 
focusing only on entrants into temporary employment, that do not have any 
rounded measure of elapsed duration attached. However, this would only 
allow us to observe the time pattern of the renewal probability for at most 
six quarters of duration, and would leave us without any information on 
the behaviour of the hazard towards the legal duration limit of fixed-term 
contracts. We therefore choose to exploit information on all spells, bearing 
in mind that the data bunching problem will somehow be reflected in the
7We also computed the duration of fixed term contracts according to a more restrictive 
definition of a single spell. In particular, we considered a spell as completed when either 
(i) there is a change in the type of contract, or (ii) there is a drop in the uncompleted 
duration of the present contract, or (iii) there is a change in the sector where the worker 
is employed. No appreciable change was detected with respect to the definition given in 
the main text, which is the one we adopt in the empirical analysis reported here.
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estimated baseline hazard.
Each spell of temporary employment can terminate with a new fixed- 
term contract, a permanent contract, joblessness, or it can be censored if the 
worker is last observed holding the fixed-term contract at the sixth interview. 
The proportion of fixed-term contracts that terminated with a conversion into 
a permanent started at nearly 20% in 1988 and has declined monotonically 
until 1994 (7%), experiencing a very weak recovery thereafter, as depicted 
in Figure 3.4. These proportions look slightly lower than those computed in 
Toharia (1996, Table 4), although they follow exactly the same trend. It is 
worth noticing however that the renewal rates computed here refer to the 
proportion of workers that hold a fixed-term contract at some point in time 
and hold instead a permanent one at the next interview, i.e. direct transitions 
from temporary to permanent employment. Toharia (1996) computes instead 
the proportion of permanent workers that held a fixed-term contract one year 
back. We prefer to look at direct switches between two subsequent interviews 
because yearly renewal may conceal additional labour market transitions.
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Figure 3.4: The proportion of fixed-term contracts being converted into 
permanent ones. Source: EPA.
Given that we cannot use an employer identifier, we are not sure that 
new permanent contracts observed in the survey are renewals of previous
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fixed-term contracts with the same employer, rather than newly-created jobs 
elsewhere in the economy. However, the fact that between 1986 and 1992 
almost all (98%) new contracts registered at employment offices have been 
fixed-term would suggest that the vast majority of permanent contracts that 
we observe in the survey are created through renewals of fixed-term ones.
Table 3.3 below reports the distribution of observed spells, according 
to their destination state. The figures reported suggest that, at relatively 
short durations, fixed-term contracts axe more likely to end up into non­
employment. As duration proceeds, the probability of non-employment de­
creases, while the chances of permanent employment increase. The table also 
shows evidence of temporary contracts continuing beyond the legal limit of 
3 years.
Table 3.3: The duration distribution of fixed-term contracts, by state of exit
duration
(quarters)
NE PC new TC same TC Total 
No. of spells
1 52.56 12.10 12.85 22.49 34599
2 37.44 8.97 36.02 17.56 27790
3 28.85 9.54 45.38 16.24 18113
4 20.44 11.23 49.96 18.36 12079
5 15.93 9.39 49.95 24.72 6516
6 14.96 10.49 28.87 45.68 2660
7 21.06 16.85 35.70 26.39 4415
8 18.68 15.50 29.27 36.55 2238
9 18.87 14.87 31.21 35.05 1224
10 24.39 22.91 52.70 0 611
11 27.60 31.78 40.62 0 1866
12 9.49 15.90 14.09 60.51 1717
13 23.39 38.84 37.77 0 466
14 and over 16.12 3.31 30.39 50.19 3903
Total 
No. of spells 40863 13245 38031 26058 118197
Notes. Each row sums to 100, with each entry giving the probability to exit into 
any of the four states, conditional on the contract duration (Source: EPA).
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Explanatory variables included in our regressions are personal and family 
characteristics of the individual such as gender, education, potential labour 
market experience,8 marital status and number of dependent children. The 
effect of job-related variables is also considered. These include an on-the-job 
training dummy, a dummy that indicates whether the reason for being on a 
fixed-term contract is the impossibility to find a permanent one in the first 
place, and a job search dummy that indicates whether the worker is currently 
looking for another job. Year dummies (referring to the year of entry in the 
survey) are also included in order to capture any time pattern in renewal 
probabilities across the Spanish business cycle. Finally, industry dummies 
and the sectoral unemployment rate (computed at the beginning of the spell) 
should capture the effect of overall labour market performance (if any) on the 
renewal of contracts. Average sample values of these variables are reported 
in Table 3.4, for both the whole sample and each type of destination. As 
one would have expected, workers who obtain a permanent renewal of their 
contract tend to be more skilled, either through formal education or on-the- 
job training. The sector in which the worker is employed also seems to be 
a good predictor of the type of transition made on termination of the fixed 
term contract, with agricultural and construction workers being significantly 
more likely than others to end up out of work.
Alba (1996a and 1998) estimates a logit model for the probability of hold­
ing a temporary contract using the EPA, 1987-1996. He finds that women, 
young and less educated people axe more likely to be temporary workers than 
permanent ones.
8 Computed as age — years of schooling —6.
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Table 3.4: Sample characteristics of temporary workers
Total sample NE PC new TC same TC
female 39.77 49.52 39.14 35.18 41.54
primary ed. or below 38.06 43.75 37.96 34.54 34.31
secondary education 52.90 49.48 50.68 56.80 53.71
university education 9.94 6.77 11.36 8.66 11.98
pot. exp. 0-4 yrs 32.34 32.30 27.69 32.03 35.21
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs 31.28 28.42 34.86 34.61 29.08
pot. exp. 16+ yrs 36.38 39.28 37.45 33.36 35.71
married 41.28 41.79 44.89 40.42 39.89
Average No. of kids 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.76 0.78
receiving educ./train. 42.53 43.50 57.05 34.31 45.64
PC not found 88.59 88.39 87.29 89.76 87.83
on the job search 8.53 11.81 5.98 6.36 7.82
agriculture 11.22 19.12 6.24 7.23 7.18
manufacturing 19.45 16.29 20.62 22.67 19.13
construction 17.33 17.00 14.70 18.23 17.88
services 51.99 47.59 58.42 51.86 55.81
Average unemp. rate 19.88 18.67 20.47 20.54 20.50
Total No. of spells 118197 40863 13245 38031 26058
Notes. All entries (except the average number of kids and the average unemploy­
ment rate) indicate the percentage of workers with a given characteristic in the 
sample (Source: EPA).
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3.3 Econometric specification
The panel structure of the data set described requires a discrete time hazard 
function approach, as outlined in Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) and 
Jenkins (1995).
Suppose that the transition out of temporary employment to permanent 
employment is a continuous process with hazard:
9i(t) = A(t) exp ( x / 0 ) , (3.1)
where X(t) denotes the baseline hazard, a; is a vector of time-invariant ex­
planatory variables, and /? is a vector of unknown coefficients. The discrete
time hazard denotes the probability of a spell of temporary employment be­
ing completed by time t -f-1, given that it was still continuing at time t. The 
discrete time hazard is therefore given by:
hi (t) = 1 — exp w  Qi(u)dv)j =  1 — exp {— exp (xi0) 7  (t)} (3.2)
where,
rt+l
7  (t) = . A(u)du (3.3)
denotes the integrated baseline hazard. We do not specify any functional 
form for the 7  (t ), and estimate the model semiparametrically.
The (log) likelihood contribution of a spell of length di is:
Li = Ci (in hi (dp +  ^ \ n { l - h i ( t )}J + ( 1 - ^ )  ]T In {1 -  hi (t)}
\  t=1 /  t=1
di—1
=  Cilnhi (di) +  '*>2 ln { l -  h{ (t)} 
t= 1
=  ^ In ( l  -  exp [ -  exp {a;* (di)' 0  +  7 (di)}])
di-i
exp{xi'0  + y ( t ) } ,  (3.4)
t=1
where Ci is a censoring indicator that takes the value 1 if di is uncensored 
and zero otherwise.
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We assumed so far that we observe entrants into temporary employment. 
Assume instead from now on that we also observe spells of temporary employ­
ment that started before the survey period, and that we can use self-reported 
information to find out the quarter in which these spells begun. In order to 
avoid a stock sample bias (see Lancaster and Chesher, 1983), we need to 
condition on the length of temporary employment at the first interview date. 
Suppose that an individual i enters the survey after ji quarters of temporary 
employment and keeps the fixed-term contract for another ki quarters, for a 
total duration di = ji +  ki, that can be either censored or uncensored. The 
individual likelihood contribution is therefore:
ji+ki-i
t=1
ji
Y .
t = 1
Li = ^  In hi (ji -f fe) +
+ (1  -  Ci)
jij i+ k i - 1
Y  M 1 “ *>•(*)} “ H M 1 “ *»«(*)}
t - 1  t= 1
j i + k i - 1
= Ci In hi (ji + ki )+  In {1 -  hi (*)}
t= ji+ 1
= ^  In (1 -  exp [ -  exp {x'fi +  7  (ji +  ki)}])
j i + k i - l
~ J2  exp { a ^ +  7 (0 }. 
t= j t+ 1
(3.5)
The model outlined specifies the likelihood of a single risk: that of termi­
nating fixed-term employment into permanent employment. As we will see 
below, fixed-term contracts can also terminate into alternative states. Given 
that we are interested in the first type of transition, we need to estimate a 
competing risk model, that, distinguishes exit into permanent employment 
from exit into alternative states. It can be illustrated that the parameters 
of a given cause-specific hazard can be estimated by treating durations fin­
ishing for other reasons as censored at time of exit (see Narendranathan and 
Stewart, 1993). We therefore treat all temporary employment spells that 
end in a new fixed-term contract or in non-employment as censored at the 
time the first contract is terminated. Having said this, the semi-parametric 
hazard specification (3.5) used for the single-risk model can be applied for 
the permanent job hazard.
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In what follows, the effect of possibly omitted regressors in the exit 
from fixed-term employment is controlled for by conditioning the hazard 
rate on an individual’s unobserved characteristics, summarized into the vari­
able v. The conditional (continuous time) hazard rate is then written as 
6i(t) = A(<) exp {xi'P + v^,  with u* independent of Xi and t. This specifi­
cation therefore identifies the three sources of variation among individual 
hazard rates: the duration of fixed-term contract (t ), the observable differ­
ences among individuals (x ) and the unobservable ones (v ). However, in a 
competing risk framework, allowing a random disturbance term in each of 
the cause-specific hazard requires an additional assumption, that imposes the 
independence of these disturbance terms across the cause-specific hazards9.
The unconditional hazard (that depends on observable regressors only) 
is obtained by integrating the conditional one over u, under the assumption 
that v is distributed as a Gamma variate10 of unit mean and variance a2. 
Under these assumptions the likelihood is given by:
Li =  In ( 1 + a2 exp {x-/3 +  7 (*)}
v t=3i+1 ,
ji+fc* ^
- C j l l  +  cr2 exp{x//? +  7 (£)}
t= j i+ i )
- 1 / a 2
- 1 / a 2
(3.6)
The baseline hazard can be estimated non-parametrically by maximising the 
log-likelihood L =  D?=i with respect to the 7  (t) terms, the vector (3 
and the variance term a2. The vector of controls Xi includes a number of 
individual and job-related characteristics, that are treated as time invariant, 
and are measured at the start of the fixed-term contract (or at the time of 
the first interview if the contract has already started).
9The alternative approach would be to assume perfect correlation (as opposed to zero 
correlation) between the cause-specific disturbance terms (see Narendranathan and Stew­
art, 1993, for a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of the two methods).
10See Lancaster (1979); see also Han and Hausman (1990) and Dolton and O’Neill (1996) 
for an application of Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity to discrete time hazard 
models.
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3.4 Empirical results
We are now in a position to estimate the econometric model outlined in 
section 3.3, for the determinants of the permanent renewal hazard. The 
results of our estimates are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Two specifications 
of our regression equation are provided. In the first, we do not allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. In the second we control for 
the effect of possibly omitted regressors by allowing for a Gamma-distributed 
disturbance term.
The effect of several individual characteristics on renewal probabilities 
are fairly standard, and consistent with previous results obtained from logit 
estimates (see Alba, 1998). Column I of Table 3.5 shows that the probability 
of a permanent renewal is higher for males than females. This is probably 
explained by the fact that women tend to have weaker labour market attach­
ment than men, and higher turnover, so that female employment may be 
perceived as relatively more risky from employers’ point of view. Being mar­
ried positively affects the probability of obtaining a PC, while the number of 
kids does not. It can also be noted that the probability of a permanent re­
newal increases monotonically with education but that only college education 
matters significantly. Also, it is enhanced by potential experience beyond 5 
years of labour market attachment.
Those who could not find a permanent job in the first place have lower 
renewal probabilities on the current job. This sort of correlation between 
past and current labour market performance may result as an effect of un­
observed ability levels, that are not captured by standard human capital 
indicators included in the regression. Also, those that are already searching 
for another job have lower renewal prospects. In this case we can plausibly 
detect a reverse causality between the two facts: once the worker realises 
that his renewal probabilities are fairly low with the current employer, he 
starts searching elsewhere11.
Receiving on the job training hardly affects permanent renewal rates. 
This is a signal that such training programmes are generally of low quality 
and anyway do not represent a significant long-term investment in the human
11 This result relates in an interesting way with the findings of Pissarides and Wadsworth 
(1994) for Britain. They find that one of the strongest influences of the likelihood of on- 
the-job search are the characteristics of the job. In particular, long job tenures reduce 
on-the-job search.
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capital of temporary workers. An alternative explanation is that also in this 
case a reverse causality problem can be detected: firms know ex-ante that 
renewal prospects are low and therefore decide not to invest too heavily on 
a temporary factor of production. Alba (1994) studies the determinants of 
firm-based training in Spain and points out that training is more concentrated 
among more senior workers in the firm than among newly’ hired workers 
because the uncertainty with respect to reaping the benefits of the training 
investment are lower12.
Industry dummies show that renewal rates are highest in services and low­
est in construction. Time fixed-effect imply in turn a roughly monotonically 
decreasing trend in the proportion of fixed-term contracts being renewed on 
a permanent basis over the whole sample period. Overall, this trend does 
not seem to be at all affected by business cycle fluctuations. Finally, sectoral 
unemployment has a negative but non-significant impact on renewal rates, 
suggesting that low renewal rates cannot really be blamed on the fact that 
high unemployment has been providing employers with abundant outside 
options of covering their temporary jobs.
The parallel estimation that controls for the effect of unobserved hetero­
geneity is represented in column II of Table 3.5. The positive and significant 
variance of the Gamma-distributed disturbance shows that there is some 
residual heterogeneity among individuals, which is not properly accounted 
for by included regressors. However, the partial effect of most regressors re­
mains practically unchanged if compared with the case where no unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for, as does the global fit of the regression.
The steps of the baseline hazard are reported in Table 3.6 and plotted 
in Figure 3.5 for our reference category (see Table 3.5). Controlling for the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in regression II simply scales upward 
the whole baseline hazard, as it is reasonable to expect, but hardly changes 
its overall time pattern. It can be noted that, with both specifications, the 
hazard is significantly higher at durations around one and three years. This 
result is suggestive that some fixed-term contracts are plausibly used as a 
screening device, and “successful” workers obtain a permanent renewal much 
before the legal limit.- A spell of roughly one year seems in fact reasonable 
for adequately assessing the performance of a worker, and in order to retain
12Similarly, Arulampalam and Booth (1998) find that workers on short-term employ­
ment contracts in Britain are less likely to receive employer-provided training.
89
those who pass the screening employers choose not to wait until the maximum 
legal limit of the contract. But there also seem to exist contracts that are 
only renewed upon expiry of the legal limit of three years: such contracts are 
probably used as a cheaper/more flexible option to adjust employment, and 
are only renewed when there is no other legal way to retain the worker.
Additional spikes in the baseline hazard are detected at'durations of 7 
and 11 quarters, respectively. These spikes are at least partly the effect of 
bunching in our reported durations. Among all the individuals who started 
their fixed-term employment spell before the first interview date, as much 
as 43% are observed to hold a temporary contract just in the first quarter 
they are interviewed, and to make a transition to a different contract - or 
to unemployment - in the following quarter. The total duration for these 
individuals is computed as 1 plus the self-reported previous duration of the 
contract. Such previous duration is reported in months only if it is lower 
that one year, otherwise is reported in years. As already mentioned, previous 
durations of 1 and 2 years imply an average uncompleted employment spell 
of 6 and 10 quarters, respectively. This finally implies that we are left with a 
considerable number of individuals that terminate the fixed-term contract at 
7 and 11 quarters, these durations being the combination of 6 and 10 quarters 
of previous employment respectively, and one quarter of employment during 
the survey period. Such bunching phenomenon is clearly evident in our 
estimates.
In order to assess how serious the data bunching problem is, we report 
in the Appendix the baseline hazard estimates obtained on a subsample of 
workers for whom the rounding problem does not apply, i.e. individuals 
whose previous uncompleted duration is lower or equal to three quarters. 
This allows us to identify eight steps in the baseline hazard. As shown in 
the estimates of Table 3.17, the spike at 7 quarters of durations disappears 
completely, while the one at 4 quarters remains. In what follows we therefore 
interpret all spikes at 7 quarters (and, by the same token, at 11 quarters) as 
an effect of the rounding problem.
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Table 3.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition
from temporary to permanent employment: Full sample
I II
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
female -0.035 (0 .020) -0.037 (0 .022)
secondary education 0.026 (0.023) 0.031 (0.026)
university education 0.186 (0.034) 0.209 (0.039)
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs 0.210 (0.024) 0.224 (0.027)
pot. exp. 16+ yrs 0.260 (0.031) 0.283 (0.035)
married 0.081 (0.023) 0.090 (0.026)
number of kids 0.011 (0.009) 0.012 (0 .010)
receiving educ./train. 0.031 (0.033) 0.048 (0.037)
PC not found -0.193 (0.026) -0.225 (0.029)
on the job search -0.187 (0.037) -0.197 (0.040)
manufacturing 0.201 (0.045) 0.181 (0.050)
construction -0.159 (0.043) -0.211 (0.047)
services 0.421 (0 .100) 0.415 (0.114)
year 1988 -0.173 (0.038) -0.225 (0.045)
year 1989 -0.420 (0.039) -0.502 (0.046)
year 1990 -0.638 (0.043) -0.752 (0.050)
year 1991 -0.635 (0.050) -0.774 (0.058)
year 1992 -0.804 (0.061) -0.925 (0.069)
year 1993 -0.895 (0.065) -1.028 (0.074)
year 1994 -0.955 (0.063) -1.093 (0.072)
year 1995 -0.890 (0.059) -1.021 (0.068)
year 1996 -1.013 (0.062) -1.149 (0.071)
unemployment rate -0.381 (0.470) -0.332 (0.530)
a2 - 0.717 (0.106)
mean log-likelihood -0.365 -0.365
No. of cases 118,197 118,197
Notes. Reference category: male, not married, with pot. exp.<5 yrs, less than 
secondary education, not receiving educ./train., reason for being in TC not because 
did not find PC, not searching for another job, employed in agriculture, entered 
survey in 1987. Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.6: Baseline hazard estimates: Full sample
quarters Coef.
I
(Std. err.) Coef.
II
(Std. err.)
1 0.157 (0.010) 0.181 (0.014)
2 0.130 (0.009) 0.159 (0.013)
3 0.130 (0.009) 0.164 (0.014)
4 0.161 (0 .012) 0.212 (0.018)
5 0.152 (0 .012) 0.215 (0 .021)
6 0.126 (0 .011) 0.189 (0 .021)
7 0.180 (0.013) 0.224 (0.019)
8 0.141 (0 .012) 0.186 (0.019)
9 0.117 (0 .012) 0.159 (0.018)
10 0.086 (0.009) 0.130 (0.016)
11 0.209 (0.016) 0.262 (0.024)
12 0.171 (0.015) 0.218 (0.023)
13 0.125 (0 .012) 0.171 (0 .020)
14 and over 0.083 (0.009) 0.113 (0.015)
Notes. The estimates report the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference 
worker, according to regressions I and II of Table 3.5. Standard errors in brakets. 
Source: EPA.
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3.5: Plots of the baseline hazard for the reference category. Source:
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o Baseline hazard, No unob het a  Baseline hazard, With unob het
9 2
We carry further tests in order to investigate two issues. First, we try 
to assess whether the 1994 reform has altered the renewal pattern of fixed- 
term contracts into permanent ones, and whether such an effect, in any, 
has affected some categories of workers more than others. The reform was 
in fact aimed at reducing the applicability of general fixed-term contracts 
and enhancing the renewal rates for labour market groups with supposedly 
poorer labour market prospects. We saw earlier that, despite the reform, 
the share of temporary employment did not fall after the reform (see Figure 
3.1). However, there was a slight increase in the proportion of fixed-term 
contracts being converted into permanent ones (see Figure 3.4). It is therefore 
interesting to document this trend, and check whether such overall tendency 
conceals diverging patterns for different labour market segments.
Second, we separately estimate renewal rates for different categories of 
workers over the whole sample period, in order to check for differences in the 
whole time pattern of renewals, and not just in their levels.
We start, therefore, by splitting our sample in the following way. The 
first sub-sample includes cohorts that entered the survey between 1987:2 and 
1992:3; the second includes cohorts that entered between 1995:1 and 1996:3. 
In this way, the first sub-sample includes any temporary contract that started 
before the 1994 reform and the second one includes any temporary contract 
that started after the 1994 reform. The results are presented in Table 3.7 
and 3.8.
Table 3.7 clearly shows that permanent renewal prospects of women and 
less educated workers have improved after 1994: the female dummy switches 
sign in regression II, as do education and training dummies. Targeting subsi­
dies to the renewal of contracts for such categories seems in fact to have been 
effective in enhancing their prospects of accessing permanent employment. 
Also, renewal prospects after 1994 have deteriorated in construction, falling 
below those in agriculture. These seem to be the only appreciable changes 
produced after 1994. The time pattern of renewals is in fact virtually un­
changed across the two sub-samples considered, delivering higher renewal 
rates at one and at three years of temporary employment, respectively, to­
gether with the usual bunching spikes.
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Table 3.7: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from
temporary to permanent employment: 1987-1993 and 1995-1996
I II
1987-1993 1995-1996
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
female -0.077 (0.024) 0.124 (0.050)
secondary education 0.057 (0.029) -0.016 (0.061)
university education 0.321 (0.042) -0.214 (0.087)
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs 0.194 (0.028) 0.207 (0.064)
pot. exp. 16+ yrs 0.255 (0.038) 0.103 (0.081)
married 0.099 (0.029) 0.100 (0.059)
number of kids 0.007 (0 .011) 0.004 (0.028)
receiving educ./train. 0.124 (0.040) -0.204 (0.092)
PC not found -0.237 (0.032) -0.084 (0.069)
on the job search -0.316 (0.048) 0.055 (0.085)
manufacturing 0.288 (0.054) 0.126 (0.185)
construction 0.054 (0.051) -0.666 (0.170)
services 0.501 (0.125) 0.256 (1.023)
year 1988 -0.183 (0.039) —
year 1989 -0.432 (0.041) —
year 1990 -0.643 (0.048) —
year 1991 -0.645 (0.058) —
year 1992 -0.717 (0.073) —
year 1993 —
year 1994 —
year 1995 —
year 1996 -0.115 (0.051)
unemployment rate -0.371 (0.674) -0.091 (4.273)
mean log-likelihood -0.434 -0.277
No. of cases 64,235 24,792
Notes. Reference category: male, not married, with pot. exp.<5 yrs, less than sec­
ondary education., not receiving educ./train., reason for being in TC not because 
did not find PC, not searching for another job, employed in agriculture, entered 
the survey in 1987 (regression I) or in 1995 (regression II). Standard errors in 
brackets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.8: Baseline hazard estimates: 
1987-1993 and 1995-1996
I II
1987-1993 1995-1996
quarters Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
1 0.151 (0.013) 0.052 (0.017)
2 0.110 (0.009) 0.062 (0 .021)
3 0.110 (0 .010) 0.059 (0 .020)
4 0.126 (0 .011) 0.095 (0.032)
5 0.110 (0 .011) 0.115 (0.039)
6 0.095 (0 .010) 0.088 (0.032)
7 0.145 (0.014) 0.105 (0.036)
8 0.120 (0 .012) 0.075 (0.028)
9 0.091 (0 .011) 0.071 (0.028)
10 0.077 (0 .010) 0.036 (0.016)
11 0.176 (0.017) 0.115 (0.041)
12 0.151 (0.016) 0.072 (0.027)
13 0.110 (0.013) 0.054 (0 .021)
14 and over 0.088 (0 .011) 0.013 (0.007)
Notes. The estimates report the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference 
worker, according to regressions I and II of Table 3.7. Standard errors in brakets. 
Source: EPA.
95
The existence of two main spikes in the renewal hazard, and the conse­
quent interpretation in terms of different uses of fixed-term contracts, leads 
us to estimate renewal probabilities for different categories of workers, de­
fined over their sector, gender, or educational attainment. This should in 
fact reveal whether fixed-term contracts provide effective screening devices 
rather than simply cheaper hirings for some categories of workers more than 
for others.
First, we concentrate on contracts in the manufacturing sector. As one 
would have expected, the incidence of seasonality seems in fact to be lowest in 
this sector, allowing us to focus mainly on general fixed-term contracts. Table 
3.9 shows that, besides higher returns to education, the manufacturing sector 
behaves very much like the rest of the economy as far as the effect of workers’ 
characteristics on renewal are concerned. Interestingly enough, year dummies 
show that the decreasing trend in renewal rates comes to a half in 1994, the 
year of the reform. The effect of sectoral unemployment is measured with 
much less precision than in other regressions, clearly because of insufficient 
variability in this regressor. When we restrict to manufacturing, sectoral 
unemployment only varies along the time series dimension, due to different 
entry times in temporary employment. Table 3.10 confirms a higher renewal 
hazard for the reference worker in manufacturing than for the rest of the 
economy, although its time pattern still delivers the conventional twin-peak 
shape.
Some gender differences in renewal rates are detected in Table 3.11. Hu­
man capital accumulation through formal education or training matters more 
for males than females, as do family variables like marital status and the num­
ber of dependent children. It seems moreover that, after 1994, renewal rates 
keep falling for males, while stabilising for females. Once more, we can detect 
the effects of the 1994 reform. Another interesting piece of information is de­
livered in Table 3.12, which shows that the one-year spike in renewal rates is 
relatively more pronounced for females than males, and the opposite happens 
for the three-year spike. If anything, this suggests that the screening use of 
fixed-term contracts applies more to female than male employment. Given 
low participation rates and high turnover of Spanish women, a temporary 
employment spell may in fact be used by employers in order to assess the 
degree of labour market attachment of their female employees.
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No substantial differences across educational groups are instead detected, 
according to the estimates of Tables 3.13, except for the fact that, like for 
women, the 1994 reform has stabilised the renewal rates of the less-skilled. 
Table 3.14 suggests moreover that the one-year spike is relatively more im­
portant than the three-year spike for the more educated. Screening and early 
renewal for successful workers plausibly applies to the skilled rather than the 
unskilled.
The last step consists in estimating the determinants of a different desti­
nation of fixed-term contracts, namely non-employment, representing either 
unemployment or inactivity. Table 3.15 shows that women, less educated 
or experienced workers, as well as agricultural workers are more likely to 
end up jobless at the end of their temporary unemployment spell. The time 
pattern of such transition, reported in Table 3.16, shows the familiar data 
bunching spikes at durations 7 and 11 quarters. Having said this, the proba­
bility to leave employment decreases monotonically with the duration of the 
fixed-term contract, and rises sharply shortly after the legal limit of three 
years.
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Table 3.9: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary
to permanent employment: Manufacturing sector
Coef. (Std. err.)
female -0.123 (0.043)
secondary education 0.035 (0.050)
university education 0.481 (0.087)
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs 0.178 (0.050)
pot. exp. 16+ yrs 0.186 (0.072)
married 0.174 (0.055)
number of kids 0.010 (0 .021)
receiving educ./train. 0.102 (0.088)
PC not found -0.341 (0.059)
on the job search -0.378 (0 .121)
year 1988 -0.197 (0.080)
year 1989 -0.449 (0.084)
year 1990 -0.655 (0.103)
year 1991 -0.673 (0.133)
year 1992 -0.864 (0.166)
year 1993 -0.930 (0.196)
year 1994 -0.860 (0.150)
year 1995 -0.785 (0.126)
year 1996 -0.861 (0.132)
unemployment rate -0.357 (3.140)
mean log-likelihood -0.388
No. of cases 22,994
Notes. Reference category: male, not married, with pot. exp.<5 yrs, less than sec­
ondary education., not receiving educ./train., reason for being in TC not because 
did not find PC, not searching for another job, entered survey in 1987. Standard 
errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.10: Baseline hazard estimates: 
Manufacturing sector
quarters Coef. (Std. err.)
1 0.213 (0.073)
2 0.166 (0.057)
3 0.176 (0.060)
4 0.212 (0.072)
5 0.234 (0.080)
6 0.150 (0.054)
7 0.226 (0.078)
8 0.145 (0.052)
9 0.132 (0.049)
10 0.141 (0.052)
11 0.261 (0.091)
12 0.276 (0.098)
13 0.246 (0.089)
14 and over 0.148 (0.056)
Notes. The estimates report the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference 
worker, according to the regression of Table 3.9. Standard errors in brakets. 
Source: EPA.
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Table 3.11: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from
temporary to permanent employment: Males and Females •
I II
Males Females
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
secondary education 0.112 (0.030) -0.122 (0.039)
university education 0.335 (0.047) -0.008 (0.051)
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs 0.256 (0.031) 0.139 (0.037)
pot. exp. 16+ yrs 0.285 (0.042) 0.197 (0.048)
married 0.135 (0.031) 0.016 (0.036)
number of kids 0.022 (0 .012) -0.009 (0.015)
receiving educ./train. 0.086 (0.048) -0.025 (0.047)
PC not found -0.161 (0.035) -0.234 (0.039)
on the job search -0.349 (0.054) -0.053 (0.050)
manufacturing 0.175 (0.051) 0.269 (0.105)
construction -0.206 (0.046) 0.213 (0.149)
services 0.360 (0 .122) 0.518 (0.199)
year 1988 -0.144 (0.047) -0.214 (0.066)
year 1989 -0.419 (0.047) -0.417 (0.070)
year 1990 -0.649 (0.052) -0.609 (0.081)
year 1991 -0.644 (0.059) -0.619 (0.096)
year 1992 -0.844 (0.077) -0.712 (0.111)
year 1993 -0.897 (0.082) -0.859 (0.120)
year 1994 -0.973 (0.080) -0.890 (0.117)
year 1995 -0.944 (0.075) -0.767 (0.109)
year 1996 -1.058 (0.080) -0.889 (0 .111)
unemployment rate -0.388 (0.588) -0.179 (0.900)
mean log-likelihood -0.371 -0.354
No. of cases 71,193 47,004
Notes. Reference category: not married, with pot. exp.<5 yrs, less than secondary 
education., not receiving educ./train., reason for being in TC not because did not 
find PC, not searching for another job, employed in agriculture, entered survey in 
1987. Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.12: Baseline hazard estimates:
Males and Females
I II
Males Females
quarters Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
1 0.141 (0 .012) 0.162 (0 .020)
2 0.119 (0 .010) 0.130 (0.017)
3 0.115 (0 .010) 0.134 (0.018)
4 0.138 (0.013) 0.178 (0.024)
5 0.129 (0.013) 0.172 (0.024)
6 0.105 (0 .012) 0.149 (0.023)
7 0.164 (0.016) 0.178 (0.025)
8 0.120 (0.013) 0.159 (0.024)
9 0.104 (0.013) 0.118 (0 .021)
10 0.077 (0 .011) 0.087 (0.016)
11 0.178 (0.018) 0.230 (0.032)
12 0.168 (0.019) 0.143 (0.023)
13 0.115 (0.015) 0.122 (0 .021)
14 and over 0.082 (0 .011) 0.070 (0.014)
Notes. The estimates report the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference 
worker, according to regressions I and II of Table 3.11. Standard errors in brakets. 
Source: EPA.
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Table 3.13: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from
temporary to permanent employment: High and Low education
I II
High education Low education
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
female -0.055 (0.024) 0.021 (0.035)
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs 0.181 (0.026) 0.167 (0.067)
pot. exp. 16+ yrs 0.255 (0.039) 0.195 (0.067)
married 0.128 (0.030) 0.066 (0.038)
number of kids -0.001 (0.014) 0.006 (0.013)
receiving educ./train. 0.033 (0.035) 0.288 (0.117)
PC not found -0.229 (0.033) -0.140 (0.044)
on the job search -0.153 (0.045) -0.239 (0.064)
manufacturing -0.009 (0.073) 0.226 (0.062)
construction -0.347 (0.073) -0.090 (0.053)
services 0.210 (0.144) 0.348 (0.148)
year 1988 -0.185 (0.052) -0.143 (0.057)
year 1989 -0.386 (0.053) -0.470 (0.058)
year 1990 -0.634 (0.059) -0.661 (0.064)
year 1991 -0.601 (0.068) -0.711 (0.076)
year 1992 -0.849 (0.079) -0.519 (0.140)
year 1993 -0.941 (0.086) -0.622 (0.143)
year 1994 -0.944 (0.082) -0.766 (0.143)
year 1995 -0.872 (0.076) -0.701 (0.141)
year 1996 -1.014 (0.079) -0.768 (0.144)
unemployment rate -0.361 (0.637) -0.575 (0.728)
mean log-likelihood -0 367 -0.360
No. of cases 73,216 44,981
Notes. High education: with secondary education or above. Reference category: 
male, not married, with pot. exp.<5 yrs, not receiving educ./train., reason for 
being in TC not because did not find PC, not searching for another job, employed 
in agriculture, entered survey in 1987. Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.14: Baseline hazard estimates: 
High and Low education
I II
High education Low education
quarters Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
1 0.201 (0.018) 0.114 (0.017)
2 0.173 (0.015) 0.090 (0.014)
3 0.180 (0.017) 0.083 (0.013)
4 0.236 (0 .022) 0.093 (0.015)
5 0.204 (0 .021) 0.103 (0.017)
6 0.162 (0.019) 0.094 (0.017)
7 0.238 (0.023) 0.125 (0 .020)
8 0.186 (0.021) 0.101 (0.018)
9 0.163 (0 .021) 0.073 (0.014)
10 0.123 (0.017) 0.052 (0 .011)
11 0.283 (0.029) 0.141 (0.023)
12 0.229 (0.027) 0.116 (0 .021)
13 0.170 (0 .022) 0.083 (0.016)
14 and over 0.127 (0.018) 0.046 (0 .010)
Notes. High education: with secondary education or above. The estimates report 
the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference worker, according to regressions 
I and II of Table 3.13. Standard errors in brakets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.15: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary
employment to non-employment
Coef. (Std. err.)
female 0.323 (0 .011)
secondary education -0.166 (0.013)
university education -0.462 (0.023)
pot. exp. 5-15 yrs -0.159 (0.014)
pot. exp. 16-f yrs -0.122 (0.018)
married -0.098 (0.014)
number of kids 0.024 (0.005)
receiving educ./train. -0.045 (0.017)
PC not found -0.097 (0.015)
on the job search 0.360 (0.015)
manufacturing -0.796 (0 .021)
construction -0.655 (0.018)
services -0.601 (0.053)
year 1988 -0.045 (0.026)
year 1989 -0.242 (0.026)
year 1990 -0.332 (0.027)
year 1991 -0.068 (0.028)
year 1992 -0.095 (0.032)
year 1993 -0.087 (0.033)
year 1994 -0.171 (0.032)
year 1995 -0.136 (0.031)
year 1996 -0.186 (0.032)
unemployment rate -0.792 (0.243)
mean log-likelihood -0.748
No. of cases 118,197
Notes. Reference category: male, not married, with pot. exp. <5 yrs, less than sec­
ondary education., not receiving educ./train., reason for being in TC not because 
did not find PC, not searching for another job, employed in agriculture, entered 
survey in 1987. Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Table 3.16: Baseline hazard estimates for the transition from temporary
employment to non-employment
quarters Coef. (Std. err.)
1 1.020 (0.036)
2 0.886 (0.032)
3 0.702 (0.026)
4 0.561 (0.023)
5 0.512 (0.024)
6 0.385 (0.024)
7 0.486 (0.023)
8 0.378 (0.023)
9 0.336 (0.025)
10 0.211 (0.019)
11 0.427 (0.024)
12 0.244 (0 .021)
13 0.177 (0.018)
14 and over 0.812 (0.046)
Notes. The estimates report the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference 
worker, according to the regression of Table 3.15. Standard errors in brakets. 
Source: EPA.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the determinants of the renewal of fixed- 
term contracts into permanent contracts in Spain. This analysis was moti­
vated by the observation of a massive use of fixed-term contracts after their 
introduction at the end of 1984, specially in non-seasonal jobs. The analysis 
was led in the context of a duration model for temporary employment, with 
flexible duration dependence for the exit into permanent employment using 
longitudinal Spanish Labour Force Survey for the period 1987:2 and 1996:3.
The main focus of the chapter was to investigate other reasons why firms 
opt for temporary hirings than for covering jobs whose underlying nature is 
seasonal, as has been typically the case for Spain before the 1984 reform.
We find that the shape of the baseline hazard is suggestive of two possible 
uses of temporary contracts by employers. The fact that there are impor­
tant spikes at durations around 1 year is supporting the idea that temporary 
contracts are used as an screening device instrument. That is, “successful 
workers” get renewed into permanent contracts much before the legal limit 
of their contracts. In other words, once a “good match” is found, it is re­
tained with a permanent contract much before the legal limit of temporary 
contracts. This use of fixed-term contracts seems to apply more to women 
than to men and to the more skilled workers than to less skilled ones.
At the same time, there is a much pronounced spike at 3 years coinciding 
with the legal limit of temporary contracts. This supports the idea that some 
employers also use temporary contracts just because these provide a cheaper 
option.
It is also found that the probability of obtaining a contract conversion is 
quite disconnected to the state of the Spanish business cycle. Time fixed- 
effect imply in turn a roughly monotonically decreasing trend in the propor­
tion of fixed-term contracts being renewed on a permanent basis over the 
whole sample period.
We have also investigated the effects of the 1994 reform, which limited 
the applicability of fixed-term contracts and enhance the transformation of 
this contracts into permanent ones. According to our results, this reform has 
been rather ineffective in reducing the incidence of temporary hirings. But, 
as far as the transformation of temporary contracts into permanent ones, we 
find that permanent renewal prospects of women and less educated workers 
have improved after 1994.
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3.6 Appendix: Baseline hazard estim ates for 
durations unaffected by the data-bunching 
problem.
Table 3.17: Baseline hazard estimates for the transition from temporary 
employment to permanent employment: Subsample with previous duration 
< 3 quarters
quarters Coef. (Std. err.)
1 0.153 (0 .011)
2 0.127 (0.009)
3 0.127 (0 .010)
4 0.153 (0 .012)
5 0.148 (0 .012)
6 0.123 (0 .012)
7 0.102 (0 .012)
8 0.132 (0.023)
Notes. The estimates report the steps of the baseline hazard for the reference 
worker, as defined in Table 3.5. Standard errors in brakets. Mean log-likelihood: 
-0.338. Number of cases: 104,872. Source: EPA.
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Chapter 4
The effects of fixed-term  
contracts on the duration  
distribution of unemployment: 
the Spanish case
4.1 Introduction
In 1984, Spain introduced fixed-term contracts as part of the flexibility mea­
sures implemented to fight high and persistent levels of unemployment that 
the economy was suffering since the late 1970’s. For the last two decades, 
Spanish unemployment has been around 20% of the labour force, the highest 
of OECD countries. The fact that Spain is also considered among the most 
regulated labour markets in the OECD motivated this type of reform (see 
OECD, 1994b). But, 15 years after of the introduction of this measure, there 
is a wide consensus among economists and policy makers that this policy has 
been somehow a disappointing experience in terms of its effects on unem­
ployment (see Jimeno and Toharia (1994)). Indeed, the unemployment rate 
today is still as high as in the 1980’s (see figure 4.1 below).
However, an additional channel by which fixed-term contracts could po­
tentially improve the functioning of the labour market is through their im­
pact on the duration of unemployment. Along with the high rates of unem­
ployment, another worrying feature of European labour markets that also
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affects Spain is the high proportion of unemployed workers who have been 
unemployed for a long period of time (see OECD, 1993). In particular, the 
proportion of the unemployed workers who have been unemployed for more 
than 12 months (the long-term unemployed, LTU1) is more than 50% of the 
unemployed pool in Spain (see Figure 4.1). This share of LTU is among the 
highest in OECD countries (see Machin and Manning, 1998):
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Figure 4.1: Unemployment rate, proportion of LTU and share of temporary 
contracts, 1980-1996. Source: EPA.
Typically, European labour markets have been characterised by a predom­
inant use of permanent contracts with, what appear to be, high firing costs. 
Fixed-term contracts are a more flexible type of labour contracts since they 
have much lower requirements in terms of firing indemnities, wages and so­
cial security charges than permanent contracts2. Since the 1980’s, the labour
1This is the measure that is commonly used (see Machin and Manning (1998)).
2 For a comparison of fixed-term contracts regulation across European countries see 
Grubb and Wells (1993), OECD (1993 and 1994a).
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market has becom e more dynam ic , i.e. there has been an increase in in­
flows and outflows from unemployment to employment (see Toharia (1997)). 
This fact has been mainly driven by fixed-term contracts: after the 1984 re­
form, around 98% of all newly registered contracts were fixed-term contracts 
(see Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992)). Bover et al. (1997) find that tem po­
rary contracts increase the employment chances of the unemployed in Spain. 
Finally, Garcia-Serrano (1998) studies the role of fixed-contracts in worker 
turnover in Spain and concludes that these contracts account for the largest 
portion of the hiring and separations rates.
As m entioned in Machin and Manning (1998), when the outflow rate 
increases at any duration of unemployment, the incidence of LTU tends to  
lower. This can be seen in figure 4.2. In this figure, we plot the proportion 
of LTU against the unemployment rate. We can see that there is a general 
positive relation between the unemployment rate and the incidence of LTU, 
as well as anti-clock wise loops over the cycle. Comparing years which are 
at the sam e point in the cycle, say 1983 to 1985 and 1992 to 1994, we can 
see that there has been a shift in the unemployment rate-LTU relationship. 
For a given unem ployment rate, the incidence of LTU in the early 1990’s is 
lower than in the m id-1980’s.
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Figure 4.2: The incidence of LTU and the unemployment rate, 1980-1996.
Source: EPA.
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An important question remains open. That is, if the introduction of 
temporary contracts (TC)3 has changed the duration distribution of unem­
ployment and, if so, to try to understand how this has happened. This 
chapter intends to have a closer look at the duration distribution of unem­
ployment before and after the introduction of fixed-term contracts in Spain. 
In particular, this chapter explores whether the increased chances of employ­
ment given by temporary contracts have been shared out equally among all 
the unemployed or not and the implications for the duration distribution of 
unemployment.
Previous studies that estimate the probability of leaving unemployment 
for Spain find that there is a very strong duration dependence (see Alba 
(1996c), Bover et al. (1997), and Machin and Manning (1998)). In other 
words, ceteris paribus, unemployed workers with shorter unemployment du­
rations have higher probabilities of leaving unemployment than those with 
longer durations. This chapter aims to analyse the changes in duration de­
pendence of the unemployed in the presence of temporary contracts. Given 
the strong duration dependence, the question that this chapter explores is 
important because if employment chances have not been equally distributed 
among all the unemployed, then the duration of those who remain stuck in 
unemployment will tend to be higher and higher.
The econometric method used in this chapter in order to explore this idea 
is a parametric hazard model using cross-sectional yearly data drawn from 
the Spanish Labour Force Survey from 1980 to 1996. We exploit this data 
following the duration model suggested by Nickell (1979).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
data used. Section 4.3 provides a duration model for the transition from 
unemployment to employment. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results 
and section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The data
We use the Spanish Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de la Poblacion Activa, 
EPA), which is carried out quarterly on a sample of some 60,000 households.
3The terms fixed-term contracts and temporary contracts (TC) are used interchange­
ably here.
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It is designed to be representative of the total Spanish population, and con­
tains very detailed information about the labour force status of individuals.
Our sample contains data of all the second quarters from 1980 to 1996. 
The time span of the sample is an important feature of the data because it 
will allow us to analyse the characteristics of the unemployed before and after 
the introduction of fixed-term contracts. All the unemployed people in the 
sample are asked for how long they have been looking for a job. This search 
time will be used as the individual uncompleted duration of unemployment. 
Results will be based on this variable. In steady state, the average uncom­
pleted duration of unemployment is proportional to the average completed 
duration of unemployment4.
There have been several methodological reforms in the EPA which have 
implied changes in the way some questions have been asked as well as the 
inclusion of more variables over time. In particular, the way the surveyed un­
employed workers are asked about their duration in unemployment and the 
possible answers given as options by the EPA questionnaires have changed 
three times (see appendix (4.6.1), for details). This implies that the precision 
of the true duration in unemployment reported varies across time. Specifi­
cally, the way this question has been set allows more precise answers in the 
more recent data. In the earlier years, the possible answers were designed in 
the form of a band (for example, 1 to 3 months). In order to be able to use 
the whole sample period in a comparable way, we will aggregate the more 
recent data into the same bands of the earlier data5.
In order to carry out our analysis, we will split the sample into 3 different 
subperiods according to the importance of fixed-term contracts in the econ­
omy. Since fixed-term contracts were introduced at the end of 1984, there 
has been an increasing proportion of this type of contracts in total employ­
ment reaching its maximum of 35% in 1995 (see figure 4.1). Since then, this 
proportion has remained quite stable with a small decreasing trend6. Before 
the 1984 reform, temporary contracts were only allowed for seasonal jobs.
4See Layard et al (1991), chapter 5.
5In particular, the duration variable will be summarised in the following bands: less 
than 1 month, 1 to 3 months, 3 to 6 months, 6 to 12 months, 12 to 24 months, 24 months 
or more.
6In 1994, there was a second reform which tried to limit the applicability of fixed- 
term contracts. But as it can be seen in figure 4.1, the impact of this second reform is 
negligeable.
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One key feature of the reform was that it allowed the use of temporary con­
tracts for jobs whose nature does not need to be seasonal. As was shown in 
chapter 3 (see figure 3.1), the higher share of TC in total employment should 
be mainly attributed to their widespread use in non-seasonal jobs.
The sample is divided in the following 3 subperiods. First, the pre-reform 
period, from 1980 to 1984, where there were no “new” fixed-term contracts 
in the economy7. Second, the period immediately after the reform, from 
1985 to 1989, where there is already an important proportion of fixed-term 
contracts but still not very high8. And third, the period 1990-1996, where 
there is a high proportion of fixed-term contracts in the economy9.
As mentioned, the EPA has undergone important changes over time. This 
also concerns the number of variables available. In particular, until 1987 
there was no information on unemployment benefits or on the reason for 
previous job loss. These variables are particularly important for the analysis 
of the probability of leaving unemployment. In order to fully exploit all 
the relevant information contained in the data, our analysis will be carried 
out in two parts. First, we use all the years of the sample, from 1980 to 
1996. The analysis is undertaken with those variables common to all sample 
years. This first part thus exploits information for a very long time period 
at the expense of some relevant variables only available in the most recent 
years. These additional variables will be exploited in the second part of the 
analysis for those fewer years for which it is available, from 1987 to 1996. 
Performing the empirical analysis in this way allows us to make use of all 
available relevant information in our data.
For this first part of the analysis, the division of the sample will be done 
as described above, that is, a period with no “new” temporary contracts will 
be compared to a period with few temporary contracts and to a period with 
a high proportion of temporary contracts in the economy. In the second part 
of the analysis, from 1987 to 1996, more explanatory variables are available 
throughout the period. We will use them all to compare a period with few 
temporary contracts (1987 to 1989) with a period with a high proportion of
7We refer as “new” temporary contracts to those introduced by the reform at the end 
of 1984. So, any temporary contract before that refers to a seasonal contract.
8It is only possible to calculate the share of TC after 1987 because before that year it 
was not included in the EPA. The average share of TC in total employment for the period 
1987-1989 is 22.78%.
9The average share of TC in total employment over this period is 33.28%.
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temporary contracts (1990 to 1996).
Our sample includes all individuals who are unemployed and declare how 
long they have been searching for a job. We will focus on men since there 
is no information available on children or their partner’s labour market sit­
uation, which is particularly important in the attachment of women to the 
labour market. We will also exclude men aged 16 to 19 years old from our 
sample, given the instability of their attachment to the labour market, and 
men aged 64 or more because transitions to non-employment are very likely10. 
Since we want to focus on the effects of fixed-term contracts on the existing 
distribution of unemployment, we will also exclude first-job seekers and peo­
ple who had never left education11. This leaves us with a sample of 84,885 
unemployed workers.
Explanatory variables available for the whole sample period are personal 
characteristics of the individual such as age, education and being head of 
household. Year dummies (referring to the year interviewed) are also included 
in our regressions in order to capture any time pattern in the employment 
probabilities. Finally, the sectoral unemployment rate in which the worker 
had his previous job (computed at the time of job loss) is also included to 
capture business cycle effects12. For the second part of the analysis (1987 
to 1996) two more variables are also available. A dummy variable that in­
dicates if the worker receives unemployment benefits (UI)13. And a variable
10See Bover et al. (1997) for a very similar sample.
11 Alba (1996b) estimates the determinants of the employment probabilities of first job 
seekers.
12See Bover et al. (1997) for a more detailed study of business cycle effects on unem­
ployment duration.
13As in most European countries, there are two types of unemployment benefits in 
Spain. The unemployment insurance system (UI) provides benefits to those workers with 
tenure in their previous job of at least 6 months (12 months after 1992). Benefit duration 
is equal to half of the accumulated tenure, with a maximum of two years (one third 
after 1992). The replacement ratio is reduced with duration of unemployment: it is 
80% of the (average) previous wage during the first 6 months, then it is 70% during the 
following 6 months and it is 60% during the last year (these ratios were reduced after 
1992). The unemployment assistance system (UA) is designed to give supplementary 
income to workers with dependants and whose average family income is below 75% of 
the minimum wage. Workers who axe not eligible to UI or who have exhausted them 
can receive UA benefits according to the family characteristics mentioned. They receive 
75% of the minimum wage during the whole entitled length. Benefit duration depends on 
tenure and age (those older than 45 have longer benefits after 1989), with a maximum of
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that indicates the reason for job loss. From this variable, we construct a 
dummy that indicates if the reason for separation from the previous job was 
the end of a temporary contract (end TC). This variable is very important 
for our purpose since it can potentially capture all the unemployed workers 
that enjoy the greater employment chances given by this type of contract. 
Separate estimation of the model will be done for these workers.
The table 4.1 reports average sample values of these variables for the first 
and second part of our analysis.
Table 4.1: Sample characteristics of unemployed workers
1980-1996 1987-1996
age 20-30 39.93 41.32
age 30-44 31.95 32.71
age 45-64 28.12 25.97
head of household 52.63 49.32
primary ed. or below 65.28 55.74
second, or univ. ed. 34.72 44.26
UI — 44.82
end TC — 70.70
Average unemp. rate 17.04 17.47
Total No. of spells 84885 51303
Notes. All entries (except the average unemployment rate) indicate the percentage 
of workers with a given characteristic in the sample (Source: EPA).
4.3 Econometric specification
As mentioned, our sample only has cross-sectional data on uncompleted spells 
of unemployment. We will estimate the hazard rate of leaving unemployment 
following the method proposed by Nickell (1979).
Suppose that the probability of an unemployed individual i of leaving 
unemployment from time t to time t + 1, conditional on having entered 
unemployment at time t — s and on his being unemployed at t is given by:
2 years.
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p ( X i ( t i , s ) , s )
where ti is the date of the interview (that is, in our case, the second quarter
of every year) and Xi are the relevant characteristics of the individual i. 
The particular specification form of p that we will estimate is a simple logit 
distribution which defines p in the following way14:
p{xi(ti, s), s) =  (1 +  exp(-2/i))-1 (4.1)
where
Vi = Po +  fa i  +  aqs +  a 2s2
To write the likelihood, we need to derive the probability for an individual 
of being unemployed at time t. First, let fi(t, v) be the probability of individ­
ual i being unemployed at time t conditional on having entered unemployed 
at time t — v. We have:
/i(M ) =  for v > 1
T =  1
By definition, fi(t, 0) =  1, that is, every unemployed of zero duration 
has survived in unemployment with certainty.
Suppose that the probability of an individual i of having entered unem­
ployment at time r  is given by Ui(r). Then the probability of being unem­
ployed at time t , Ui(t), is given by:
o o
U&) — “  r )/i(^ r)
T=0
We can now write the likelihood for an unemployed individual in our 
sample, that is, the probability of having entered unemployment at time 
t — v conditional on being unemployed at time t:
14In the way we have specified p we have assumed that p does not depend on t. This is 
done essentially to prevent computational problems (see Nickell (1979)).
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L = Uj(tj -v) f i { t j ,v)
T,™=oUi{ti -  v)fi{ti,v)
As mentioned, the duration of unemployment is presented in our sample 
in the form of bands. Therefore given the date of the interview, U, the 
individual could have entered unemployment at any time between U — Oi and 
t i~bi .  Therefore given our data, the likelihood becomes:
L =  Uifa ~  t f f i j t i i v )
-  v)fi(tu v)
For instance, for someone with unemployment duration between 1 to 3 
months, the numerator of L* has 3 terms.
Obtaining prior estimates of Ui, say uiy then we can write down the like­
lihood for our unemployed sample, of individuals, 2 =  1 ,....,/.
j  _  TT ( T!i=afii{L — v)fi{U,v)\  ^
M  V E ^ o ^ (* i -  v)fi{ti,v) )
The probability of individual z, with current characteristics x^,  of having 
entered unemployment at time r  is defined by:
. . . . . . aggregate flow into unemployment in month r
u i \ T ) — k i i x i X c i i T ) ^ ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -       r - - - - - -  - r(aggregate employment +  first-job seekers)in month (r — 1)
where ki(x(.),r) is the proportion of the inflow into unemployment at 
time r  with characteristics x.
In practice, this probability is estimated by:
^ . aggregate flow into unemployment in month r
u A t )  =  constant 7-----------------------   * L J L ------- -----------  -----
(aggregate employment +  first-job seekers) in month (r — 1)
Therefore, we are assuming that the composition of flow into unemploy­
ment is fixed over time. But there are two mechanisms by which ki(x(.), r)  is
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affected over time. First, assuming that ki(x(.)Jr) is constant means that we 
are assuming that any changes in relevant characteristics over time are small 
(the direct effect of time). This is more likely to be the case the shorter the 
period of time studied. So, to the extent that we do our analysis for different 
consecutive years, we can safely ignore this. Second, assuming that ki(x(.),r) 
is constant also means that there are small changes in the proportions of in­
dividuals with particular characteristics in the inflow into unemployment. 
This point is more difficult to test mainly because there is no data on inflows 
for the different relevant characteristics. On the other hand, the aggregate 
inflow rate is remarkably stable over time (see figure 4.5 in appendix (4.6.2)).
We are now in the position to estimate the likelihood function specified by 
(4.2). There is however one last thing to be specified in order to compute such 
likelihood. This has to do with the infinite sum in the denominator. We will 
assume that for long enough duration, the conditional probability specified 
in (4.1) does not depend on duration and that the estimated probability of 
having entered unemployment is a constant. In particular, we make these 
assumptions for durations greater than 36 months. The corresponding u is 
the average inflow rate of the calendar year corresponding to 36 months of 
duration of unemployment for every individual (1436). Finally, the likelihood 
to be maximised is as follows:
£ = ni=l U 36
Pi  (35) fi(tu 36) /
4.4 Empirical results
We now estimate the hazard of leaving unemployment as modeled in the 
previous section. As mentioned, the empirical work is done in two parts: 
first, for all the years of our sample (from 1980 to 1996) using all the vari­
ables common in each of these years (section (4.4.1)). Second, for the years 
from 1987 to 1996 using the additional variables available from 1987 onwards 
(section (4.4.2)).
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4.4.1 Empirical results for 1980-1996
Table 4.2 reports the estimates for the whole sample, 1980-1996. And table 
4.3 reports estimates of separate regressions for the different groups of years 
according to the incidence of temporary employment in the economy: none 
(column II), low (column III) and high (column IV).
The effects of the individual characteristics on the probability of exiting 
unemployment are fairly standard and consistent with previous results ob­
tained from logit estimates (see Alba, 1996c). As can be seen in the four 
columns, the re-employment probability decreases with age. And the effect 
is larger for the group of older workers. Being head of household substan­
tially increases the probability of finding a job. This has to do with lower 
reservation wages of these individuals given their household responsibilities 
and for the same reason their attachment to the labour market is strong.
The estimated coefficients on education are in general small and insignifi­
cant. The only time they are clearly significant is for the period from 1980 to 
1984 (column II). This result may be partially explained by the fact that very 
few high educated people are among the unemployed15. Alba (1996c) finds 
that the variable education increases the likelihood of reemployment only for 
workers with vocational education. Finally, year dummies follow closely the 
trend of the economic cycle (see figure 4.1) and sectoral unemployment has 
the expected negative effect on the probability of finding a job.
The more interesting results come from comparing the hazard of leaving 
unemployment at different durations and at different moments in time for a 
reference worker. In figure 4.3, we plot the hazard of leaving unemployment 
for three different years from each of the separate regressions. In particular, 
we compare the probability of leaving unemployment for a reference group 
in 1980, 1989 and in 1996. Figure 4.3 shows very clearly how the chances of 
leaving unemployment at different durations of unemployment has changed 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s. For very short durations (until 6 months), the 
chances are better and better over these years. And the reverse is true for 
the unemployment with durations greater than 6 months. In other words, 
the very short term unemployment have enjoyed greater employment chances 
at the expense of the long-term unemployed. The hazard function of 1980
15In particular, for the period 1980-1984 an average of 18% of the unemployed had high 
education.
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looks flat when compared with the hazard of later years16. Then, there is 
a big shift in 1989 in the direction just described and in 1996 the tendency 
continues although at a much lower pace.
Thus, throughout the whole period studied there has been an important 
change in the hazard rates of leaving unemployment such that it has bene­
fited the unemployed with shorter durations at the expense' of the workers 
who have been unemployed for longer durations. A possible explanation for 
this fact is the introduction of fixed-term contracts. As mentioned, these 
contracts have implied an increase in the average outflow rate. At the same 
time, we observe that the outflow rate has increased for the unemployed 
with shorter durations while it has decreased for the unemployed with longer 
durations. To the extent that these contracts have implied that higher em­
ployment chances have not been shared equally among all the unemployed, 
then the long term unemployed, who have high duration dependence, have 
experienced lower chances to get a job. This explanation seems plausible 
for the Spanish case since in the time period studied the introduction of 
fixed-term contracts has been the main institutional change.
16This is consistent with the finding of Alba and Freeman (1990). Using data from the 
“Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida y Trabajo” they find that the hazard rate for displaced 
workers was relatively flat in 1981-85.
Table 4.2: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
______ unemployment: full sample______
I
1980-1996 
Coef. (Std. err.)
constant 0.887 (0.082)
s/10 -1.314 (0.099)
s2/100 0.396 (0.031)
age 30-44 -0.276 (0.020)
age 45-64 -0.633 (0.024)
head of household 0.335 (0.019)
second, or univ. ed. -0.020 (0.017)
year 1981 -0.176 (0.042)
year 1982 -0.604 (0.048)
year 1983 -0.702 (0.047)
year 1984 -0.978 (0.047)
year 1985 -1.239 (0.053)
year 1986 -1.117 (0.050)
year 1987 -0.779 (0.046)
year 1988 -0.585 (0.041)
year 1989 -0.533 (0.042)
year 1990 -0.398 (0.041)
year 1991 -0.220 (0.040)
year 1992 -0.275 (0.040)
year 1993 -0.752 (0.043)
year 1994 -1.012 (0.047)
year 1995 -0.957 (0.045)
year 1996 -0.840 (0.043)
log unemployment -0.865 (0.018)
mean log-likelihood -1.716
No. of cases 84885
Notes. Reference category: age: 20-29, not head of household, less than secondary 
or university education, interviewed in 1980. Standard errors in brackets. Source: 
EPA.
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Table 4.3: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
unemployment: 1980-1984, 1985-1989 and 1990-1996
II Ill IV
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1996
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
constant 0.396 (0.160) 1.765 (0.177) -0.015 (0.102)
s/10 -0.362 (0.209) -1.337 (0.206) -1.533 (0.140)
s2/100 0.162 (0.064) 0.401 (0.065) 0.446 (0.045)
age 30-44 -0.156 (0.039) -0.230 (0.040) -0.362 (0.028)
age 45-64 -0.562 (0.045) -0.460 (0.046) -0.814 (0.037)
head of household 0.524 (0.038) 0.336 (0.037) 0.273 (0.026)
second, or univ. ed. -0.121 (0.046) 0.002 (0.037) -0.037 (0.024)
year 1981 -0.213 (0.043) — —
year 1982 -0.708 (0.049) — —
year 1983 -0.825 (0.049) — —
year 1984 -1.118 (0.050) — —
year 1985 — — —
year 1986 — 0.191 (0.051) —
year 1987 — 0.476 (0.049) —
year 1988 — 0.537 (0.047) —
year 1989 — 0.478 (0.047) —
year 1990 — — —
year 1991 — — 0.144 (0.035)
year 1992 — — 0.007 (0.037)
year 1993 — — -0.412 (0.038)
year 1994 — — -0.696 (0.043)
year 1995 — — -0.629 (0.041)
year 1996 — — -0.462 (0.038)
log unemployment -0.995 (0.031) -1.748 (0.052) -0.523 (0.022)
mean log-likelihood 
No. of cases
-1.685
21329
-1.708
24392
-1.728
39164
Notes. Reference category: age: 20-29, not head of household, less than secondary 
or university education, interviewed in 1980 (regression II), or in 1985 (regression 
III), or in 1990 (regression IV). Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Figure 4.3: Hazard of leaving unemployment for the reference 
worker in 1980, 1989 and 1996. Source: EPA.
Notes. Reference category according to the regression II (year 1980), 
regression III (year 1989) and regression IV (year 1996) of Table 4.3.
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4*4.2 Empirical results for 1987-1996
As mentioned earlier, the number of variables available in the Spanish Labour 
Force Survey has increased over time. Therefore, we estimate a second set 
of regressions where more variables are included for the period 1987-1996. 
We can still exploit the idea that for the first years of this subsample (1987- 
1989) the impact of fixed-term contracts was lower than in the later years 
(1990-1996).
Table 4.4 reports the results for the whole sample period and for the two 
subsamples. The effects of the variables also included in the previous section 
remain very similar. The coefficient of high education is again small and 
insignificant for the years 1990-1996 and significant and positive although 
small for the years 1987-1989. Two new variables were included: a dummy 
variable for the recipients of unemployment benefits and another dummy 
which takes the value 1 if the reason for separation from the last job of the 
unemployed worker was the end of a TC.
As can be seen, the effect of UI is positive for the first specification and 
the last, and it is negative for the years 1987-1989, although not significant. 
At a first glance, this result may be surprising if one has in mind the standard 
job search theory17. According to the job search theory (see Mortensen, 1970 
and 1977), unemployment benefits (both their level and their length) have 
a disincentive effect in worker’s search intensity which in turn affects the 
probability of receiving a job offer and therefore of leaving unemployment. 
This theory also predicts an entitlement effect which goes in the opposite 
direction. More generous benefits increase the expected future utility of an 
unemployed person since getting a job implies becoming eligible for such 
benefits. Normally, this effect is thought to be smaller than the first one 
because there is discounting of future events.
There are several possible reasons behind this result. First, this variable 
is only an indicator of whether the unemployed person is holding benefits. 
There is a wide consensus that the effects of unemployment benefit levels 
are far from robust, being in general not very significant and also of small 
size, and that other dimensions of unemployment compensation may be more
17Although Toharia (1997) reviews different studies on the disincentive effects of UI in 
Spain and concludes that, on the whole, the studies available are not conclusive.
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important, such as duration of benefits18. Therefore, little can be expected 
from the variable included in our estimates since it is less informative than 
the level of unemployment benefits19.
Alba (1996c) estimates a multilogit model and includes the same dummy 
variable we include here. He finds that the effect of unemployment benefits 
is significant but small. At the same time, he interacts the eiffects of unem­
ployment benefits with duration of unemployment and finds that the effect 
is very strong in the first two months, but it declines from the third month of 
the unemployment spell. Bover et al (1997) find that the effect of receiving 
unemployment is significant and quite sizeable, but that this effect is reduced 
over the spell of unemployment. In particular, the largest effect of UI occurs 
at duration of three months.
This is suggestive of a second important element that may be behind 
the positive coefficient found in our regression. As the works cited above 
indicate, the effect of UI decreases over time. This can be seen by simply 
calculating the correlation between UI and duration of unemployment for 
different durations (see appendix (4.6.3), first column of table 4.7). Indeed, 
this correlation is higher at shorter durations. We also calculated this corre­
lation for long durations and found that not only it is not negligible but also 
it is negative. This may indeed explain our results, especially because the 
negative correlation of longer duration dominates for the whole sample (first 
row of table 4.7). Wadsworth (1990) and Schmitt and Wadsworth (1993) 
exploit the idea that on top of the effect of UI increasing the reservation 
wage (the disincentive effect), there is another effect that goes in the op­
posite direction. Benefits facilitate search by providing income with which 
finance job search efforts (the job offers effect). These works compare the 
search behaviour of benefit claimants and non-claimants. It is found that 
non-claimants search harder during the initial stages of unemployment when 
benefits may provide a temporary leisure subsidy to benefit claimants. As 
unemployment duration lenghtens, search activities fall for both groups but 
benefits recipients are able to maintain a higher level of search effort and
18See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for a review.
19On top of that, as pointed out by Alba (1996c), this dummy variable takes value zero 
both for people who are not registered in the public employment office and those who are 
registered but do not receive benefits. The problem of this data is that some unemployed 
people may have applied for unemployment benefits but do not have an answer at the 
moment of the interview.
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therefore have a relatively higher probability of receiving a job offer. This 
job offers effect seems to be present in our data in a very strong way20. A 
possible reason why the cited works on Spain may differ in the effect of UI 
is the treatment given to the unemployment duration variable21.
Finally, there is another effect that may be behind the positive coefficient 
found in our regression and that may explain differences over time (see appen­
dix (4.6.3)), second and third columns of table 4.7). There was an important 
reform of the unemployment benefit system in 1992. The motivation for this 
reform was the increased inflows and outflows from unemployment though 
temporary contracts which generated an important deficit in the Spanish 
unemployment benefit system22. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the min­
imum duration of a temporary contract was raised from 6 months to 1 year 
and consequently increased the minimum job tenure required for eligibility 
of benefits. At the same time, the level of benefits and duration was also 
reduced. This implies that the negative effect of UI at shorter durations will 
be weaker after 1992 because there is a lower proportion of people at short 
durations (recently unemployed) who receive benefits. Also, this type of re­
form can clearly generate an entitlement effect. Indeed, Alba (1996c) finds 
that the negative incentive effect of benefits on re-employment probabilities 
is reduced starting in 1993 and becoming more important from 1994 onwards. 
Accordingly, we can understand part of the difference in the coefficients of UI 
for the years 1987-1989 and 1990-1996 (reported in column II in table 4.4).
The other new variable included in this second part of the analysis is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the reason for separation in the previous job was the 
end of a temporary contract. As can be seen in table 4.4, the estimated coeffi­
cient on this variable is positive and significant. This result is in fine with the 
idea that temporary contracts have isolated some of the unemployed mak­
ing them more employable while leaving the other unemployed worse than 
before. We investigate this issue further by estimating separate regressions 
for those whose previous employment ended because of the exhaustion of a 
temporary contract and for those whose previous job ended for other reasons
20 Also, in our sample, the proportion of unemployed receiving UI is very constant across 
durations.
21 Alba (1996c) excludes from his sample unemployed people of more than 36 months. 
Bover et al. (1997) treat durations of more than 14 months as censored at 14 months.
22 See Toharia (1997) for a detailed description of the institutional features of the un­
employment benefit system.
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than the end of a fixed-term contract.
Figure 4.4 plots the hazard of leaving unemployment of the regressions 
discussed above and reported in table 4.4. In particular, we plot the hazard 
function for a reference group again in 1989 and in 1996. The results are 
very similar to the ones plotted in figure 4.3. In 1989, when there were fewer 
temporary contracts than in 1996, the probability of leaving unemployment 
at shorter durations was lower than in 1996. The reverse is true for longer 
durations. Therefore, this is also suggestive of the fact that the distribution 
of the duration of unemployment has become more unequal in the 1990’s 
compared to the late 1980’s.
The results in the first part of the analysis, with fewer variables but 
more years, are consistent with the results in the second part of the of the 
analysis, with more variables but fewer years. Therefore, the results of each 
part complement each other making our exercise meaningful.
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Table 4.4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
unemployment: 1987-1996, 1987-1989 and 1990-1996
I II Ill
1987-1996 1987-1989 1990-1996
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
constant -1.029 (0.100) 1.633 (0.256) -1.037 (0.114)
s/10 -1.144 (0.127) -0.514 (0.270) -1.091 (0.150)
s2/100 0.334 (0.040) 0.147 (0.085) 0.330 (0.047)
age 30-44 -0.256 (0.023) -0.062 (0.048) -0.320 (0.027)
age 45-64 -0.576 (0.030) -0.280 (0.055) -0.722 (0.037)
head of household 0.210 (0.022) 0.287 (0.044) 0.185 (0.026)
second, or univ. ed. -0.010 (0.020) 0.090 (0.042) -0.016 (0.024)
UI 0.228 (0.018) -0.006 (0.034) 0.337 (0.022)
end TC 0.538 (0.026) 0.331 (0.042) 0.570 (0.033)
year 1988 0.168 (0.042) 0.015 (0.040) —
year 1989 0.225 (0.042) -0.061 (0.041) —
year 1990 0.352 (0.041) — —
year 1991 0.497 (0.041) — 0.119 (0.035)
year 1992 0.418 (0.042) — -0.003 (0.037)
year 1993 -0.035 (0.044) — -0.432 (0.038)
year 1994 -0.302 (0.048) — -0.720 (0.043)
year 1995 -0.205 (0.045) — -0.592 (0.040)
year 1996 -0.053 (0.043) — -0.421 (0.037)
log unemployment -0.605 (0.020) -1.822 (0.080) -0.485 (0.022)
mean log-likelihood -1.720 -1.705 -1.721
No. of cases 51303 12139 39164
Notes. Reference category: age: 20-29, not head of household, less than secondary 
or university education, not receiving unemployment benefits, reason unemployed: 
not end TC in previous job, interviewed in 1987 (regression I and II), or in 1990 
(regression III). Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Figure 4.4: Hazard of leaving unemployment for the reference worker in
1989 and 1996. Souce: EPA.
Notes. Reference category according to the regression II (year 1989) and regression 
III (year 1996) of Table 4.4.
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Finally, we estimate the model separately for those unemployed for which 
the reason of separation in their last job was the end of a TC and for those for 
which there was another reason (this includes voluntary quits, redundancy, 
retirement, illness, etc.). Table 4.5 reports the results of such regressions. As 
can be seen, education is again insignificant for those who ended a tempo­
rary contract while, for the first time, it appears clearly sizeable, positive and 
significant for those who became unemployed for other reasons than the end 
of a temporary contract. One possible explanation is that since people who 
became unemployed because of the end of a temporary contract have greater 
chances of leaving unemployment they are more attached to the labour mar­
ket and therefore having a secondary education or university degree or not 
does not substantially affect the probability of finding a job. Instead, people 
that became unemployed for other reasons are less attached to the labour 
market and therefore having a secondary education or university degree can 
improve their chances of becoming employed.
Back to the effects of UI, the coefficient in both cases appears to be 
positive although very small and not very significant for those who became 
unemployed for reasons other than ending a temporary contract. In general, 
people in this last category are less eligible for UI than people that ended 
a temporary contract (because they quit or because they retire or because 
there is a conflict in the dismissal and the case is declared in favour of the 
firm)23.
Figure 4.5 plots the hazard of leaving unemployment for those who en­
tered unemployment as a result of the end of a temporary contract and for 
those who lost their job for other reasons. As it was already found in the 
previous regressions, people that come from a TC have greater chances of 
leaving unemployment at any duration than the others. Secondly, the haz­
ard for those that became unemployed because of the end of a temporary 
contract is more flat than for the other groups of individuals. That is, al­
though there is negative duration dependence, it is much smaller than for 
those individuals that lost their jobs for other reasons. These results are also 
suggestive of the idea that TC have increased the employment changes for a 
group of the unemployed which churns from employment to unemployment 
frequently. The remaining unemployed have lower chances and this chances 
get worse at longer durations.
23of a temporary contracts have UI, while only 24% did if unemployed for other reasons.
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Table 4.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of leaving
____________unemployment: end TC, no end TC____________
I II
end TC no end TC
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
constant -0.650 (0.105) -1.145 (0.262)
s/10 -0.844 (0.139) -2.452 (0.331)
s2/100 0.229 (0.044) 0.768 (0.103)
age 30-44 -0.215 (0.025) -0.554 (0.068)
age 45-64 -0.397 (0.031) -1.614 (0.122)
head of household 0.175 (0.024) 0.355 (0.065)
second, or univ. ed. -0.021 (0.022) 0.105 (0.056)
UI 0.260 (0.019) -0.061 (0.056)
year 1988 0.092 (0.045) 0.0475 (0.117)
year 1989 0.148 (0.045) 0.637 (0.116)
year 1990 0.270 (0.044) 0.891 (0.116)
year 1991 0.415 (0.044) 0.963 (0.115)
year 1992 0.385 (0.044) 0.596 (0.124)
year 1993 -0.093 (0.046) 0.348 (0.124)
year 1994 -0.335 (0.050) -0.175 (0.151)
year 1995 -0.193 (0.046) -0.574 (0.197)
year 1996 -0.036 (0.044) -0.339 (0.173)
log unemployment -0.594 (0.021) -0.339 (0.057)
mean log-likelihood -1.732 -1.676
No. of cases 36270 15033
Notes. Reference category: age: 20-29, not head of household, less than secondary 
or university education, not receiving unemployment benefits, interviewed in 1987. 
Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA.
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Figure 4.5: Hazard for individuals who becam e unemployed because end of 
TC  and for other reasons in 1996. Source: EPA.
Notes. Reference category according to the regression I (end TC) and regression 
II (no end TC) of Table 4.5.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the effects of the introduction of fixed-term 
contracts on the duration distribution of unemployment in Spain with par­
ticular emphasis on the changes in duration dependence. The motivation 
was, on the one hand, to study if this type of policy had an impact through 
different dimensions of the labour market given the rather unsuccessful ef­
fect of this type of policy in reducing unemployment. And, on the other 
hand, since the introduction of fixed-term contracts has made the labour 
market more dynamic, to study the impact of the increase in inflows and 
outflows from unemployment to employment as captured in the duration of 
the unemployed.
The chapter has exploited cross-sectional data available for a very long 
period of time (from 1980 to 1996) that allows an analysis of the chances of 
leaving unemployment before and after the introduction of fixed-term con­
tracts in Spain. In particular, the idea that the chapter has explored is that, 
even if the incidence of LTU may be lower due to the increased (average) 
outflow rate, if the greater chances given by temporary contracts are not 
equally distributed among all the unemployed workers, then the duration of 
those who remain stuck in unemployment will be higher and higher. We have 
found evidence of this idea. The probability of leaving unemployment for a 
reference category at different duration has changed substantially over time. 
For very short durations, until six months, the probability has become larger 
and larger in years where the incidence of temporary contracts in the econ­
omy has become more and more important. For longer durations, more than 
6 months, the reverse is true. The probability of finding a job has become 
lower and lower in the years where the presence of temporary contracts in 
the economy has become more and more important.
We also find that the chances of finding a job at any duration are signifi­
cantly higher for those unemployed workers who became unemployed due to 
the end of a temporary contract in the previous job than for those unem­
ployed workers who became unemployed for other reasons. And there is a 
stronger duration dependence for this latter group. These results are again 
suggestive that temporary contracts have implied an important increase in 
the (average) outflow from unemployment but that only some of the unem­
ployed have enjoyed these greater chances at the expense of the others. It 
seems plausible that these changes are driven by the introduction of fixed-
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term contracts since this was the major institutional change in the time 
period studied.
It is often argued that a high proportion of LTU is a possible cause of high 
unemployment itself. Although this causality has to be analysed with caution 
(see Machin and Manning (1998)), in the case of Spain it is possible that the 
limited success of flexibility measures in reducing unemployment could be 
linked to the fact that fixed-term contracts have not helped to reduce the 
duration dependence in unemployment.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 The duration of unem ploym ent in the EPA
The way in which the unemployed workers have been asked about their dura­
tion in unemployment and the possible answers given by the .EPA question­
naires has changed over time. The table below summarises these changes:
Table 4.6: The duration of the unemployment in the EPA
until 1987 (I) 1987 (II) - 1991(1) from 1992 (I)
How long have you How long have you Which day did you
been looking for a job? been looking for a job ? start looking for a job?
Less than 1 month If less than 2 years, Month
1 to 3 months number of months
3 to 6 months
6 months to 1 year If 2 years or more, Year
1 to 2 years number of years
2 years or more
In the chapter, the variable duration follows the pattern of column (I) for 
all the years.
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Figure 4.6: Flow into unemployment and stock of unemployment, in 
thousands. Source: INE, National Institute of Statistics.
Notes. The lowest duration of unemployment data available is 2 months. Both 
series belong to the second quarters of the relevant year.
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4.6.3 U  nem ploym ent benefits and duration
Table 4.7: Correlation of UI and duration of unemployment
1987-1996 1987- 1989 1990-1996
all durations -0.09 -0.04 -0.11
less than 3 months 0.15 0.14 0.16
less than 6 months 0.07 0.06 0.07
more than 6 months -0.14 -0.10 -0.16
more than 12 months -0.16 -0.13 -0.17
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